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TECHNICAL REMARKS
The data used in this paper are – unless 
otherwise indicated – based on an IMF release 
in 2007, which takes 2005 as the most recent 
year for economic data. The simulations are 
based on the quota distribution at the IMF 
following the quota increase for China, Korea, 
Mexico and Turkey in September 2006, which 
amounted to a 1.8 increase in the IMF’s total 
quotas. 
Where voting shares are discussed, it is assumed 
that all members can vote. Currently however, 
Somalia, Liberia, and Zimbabwe do not vote, so 
that the actual voting shares of the remaining 
182 members, as posted on the IMF’s website, 
are currently marginally higher than shown in 
this paper.
(Actual) quota The contribution of a country to the IMF, usually denominated in 
SDR millions.
(Actual) quota share/AQS The percentage share of a country’s quota in the IMF’s total quota. 
Quota shares represent the relative position of a country in the IMF 
and are the key variable in the current quota review.
African Constit.-19 The abbreviation used in the tables for the IMF constituency 
currently chaired by Kenya, which comprises the following 
countries: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the 
Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and Zambia.
African Constit.-24 The abbreviation used in the tables for the IMF constituency 
currently chaired by Rwanda, which comprises the following 
countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic), 
Congo (Republic), Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, and 
Togo.
Calculated quota The outcome (in SDR millions) of the five-formula framework, 
which is based on GDP, trade openness (current payments and 
current receipts), variability in exports and official reserves. 
Calculated quota share/
CQS
The percentage of a member’s calculated quota in the total 
calculated quota. Serves as reference value for the analysis of under- 
or overrepresentation and for the determination of quota increases.
Votes
Voting share/VS
Members receive one vote for each SDR 0.1 million of their quota 
plus 250 “basic votes”. The voting share (the percentage share of 
a country’s votes in the IMF) represents the relative influence of a 
country in the IMF. Next to the quota share, it is the second-most 
important variable in the review. For larger countries, voting shares 
differ only marginally from quota shares, but for smaller countries, 
the difference is substantial due to basic votes.
Under-representation/ 
over-representation
This is the gap between a country’s actual quota share and its 
calculated quota share.
LIST OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS5
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BV basic votes
EMEs emerging market economies
FDI foreign direct investment
IIP International Investment Position
IMFC International Monetary and Financial Committee 
MER market exchange rate
O openness (sum of current payments and receipts)
PPP purchasing power parity
R reserves
Rest of the world (ROW) The term used in the tables for the aggregate of countries that do 
not belong to the EU or the G7 and are not one of the 18 emerging 
markets listed.
ROW-Developing The “rest of the world” aggregate excluding the “other advanced 
economies”, i.e. without Australia, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, 
San Marino, Israel and New Zealand.
SDR Special Drawing Rights
VC variability of current receipts 
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1 INTRODUCTION1
Some time after returning from his discovery 
voyages, Christopher Columbus attended a 
dinner given in his honour. Unexpectedly, 
several guests were jealous of his success and 
began teasing him. “Anybody can sail across 
the ocean and coast along the islands on the 
other side – it is the simplest thing in the world”, 
they said. Instead of replying, Columbus took 
an egg from a dish and asked “Who among you, 
gentlemen, can make this egg stand on end?” 
The egg was passed around the table; all guests 
tried the experiment but nobody succeeded. “It 
cannot be done,” they said. Columbus took the 
egg and struck its small end gently onto the 
table so as to break the shell a little. After that 
there was no trouble in making it stand upright. 
“Gentlemen,” he said, “what is easier to do than 
this, which you said was impossible? It is the 
simplest thing in the world. Anybody can do it 
– after he has been shown how!”2 
At the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
issue of quotas – which are the member 
countries’ financial contributions to the IMF – 
is discussed around the table of the Executive 
Board every five years and discussions often 
stretch over one to two years. Quotas play a 
central role in the Fund because they determine 
not only member countries’ financial 
contributions but also their rights to draw on 
IMF financial support and their voting rights in 
the institution. Therefore, quotas are essentially 
a matter of the representation, visibility and 
influence of countries in the IMF. The quota 
discussions run like a red thread through the 
history of this institution. The Fund’s historians3 
provide ample testimony of the intricacies, 
political difficulties and resource-intensiveness 
of these discussions over the past decades.
At present, the Board is engaged in what is now 
the 13th review of quotas in the institution. 
Once again the quota discussions are turning 
out to be difficult. They are difficult because 
many countries would like to see their share in 
the Fund increase, no country wants to see their 
share shrink, and yet it is a zero-sum game. 
This time, the quota review looks particularly 
important, if not vital, for the institution, in 
view of the focus on representation rather than 
on the financial aspects. The Fund is faced with 
considerable pressure in particular from 
emerging economies to raise their representation. 
The systemic role of emerging economies in the 
global economy is felt on a daily basis by 
consumers, firms and investors around the 
world, and these countries have considerably 
improved their economic and financial 
fundamentals compared with some years ago. 
Some regional cooperation initiatives, 
especially in Asia, could even be seen as 
rivalling the Fund’s role in the long term, and 
the substantial endowment of emerging 
economies with foreign exchange reserves 
would also make such initiatives financially 
powerful. 
The institution is also facing ongoing pressure 
from low-income and developing economies to 
increase their voice in the Fund. Many of these 
countries feel marginalised in the Fund’s 
decision-making. Yet these members are deeply 
affected by developments in the global economy 
and IMF policies, as they have been long-
standing recipients of financial assistance and 
are today virtually the only country group over 
which the Fund has direct policy influence 
through conditionality in its programmes. 
Hence the Fund has to ensure that its entire 
membership continues to be adequately 
represented, if it does not want to lose its 
universal status.
However, what makes the current quota review 
particularly difficult and important is that this 
time, the Fund has decided not only to adjust 
country representation but also to fundamentally 
overhaul its framework for determining quotas. 
This framework, which is the result of decades 
of compromises, reflects a degree of complexity 
that makes it unwieldy even according to 
1  The authors would like to thank L. Bini Smaghi, F. Moss, G. 
Pineau, M. Fratzscher, C. Just, R. Ritter and A. Benassy-Quéré 
for very helpful comments, and É. Hörcsöki and A. Fauvet for 
excellent editorial assistance.
2  Adapted from Baldwin (1905).
3  See Horsefield (1969); de Vries (1985); and Boughton (2001).7
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insiders. It consists of five different formulae 
with different economic variables that are first 
applied individually to all members. The results 
of the most favourable combination of formulae 
for a country are then picked to yield the basis 
for the quota. Besides being complex, the 
framework is inherently intransparent. This is 
why, at its last Annual Meetings in Singapore in 
autumn 2006, the Fund committed itself to a 
deadline for developing a more appropriate 
formula to determine members’ quotas.
The search for a new quota formula that is 
simple, transparent and satisfies virtually the 
entire membership is comparable to a search for 
a solution to Columbus’ egg problem. “It cannot 
be done”, some officials involved in past 
processes may say. As a result, the egg of a 
simple, transparent and widely acceptable quota 
formula has been passed around the Board table 
for years if not decades. Some, who have 
actively tried to develop new formulae, may 
say “I did it” but then have to acknowledge that 
the membership did not accept their proposal. 
Many proposals have indeed been devised, but 
nobody has found a way to break its shell “a 
little” so that it stands the test of wide 
acceptance. 
So why should it work this time? The best 
answer may be: because it has to. The highest 
governing body of the Fund, the Board of 
Governors, has officially and publicly opened 
the search for a new formula with the request 
that a solution be found within an ambitious 
time frame. Hence the Fund has set the stakes 
of representation and the need for a better quota 
formula so high that a solution must be found 
to maintain the credibility of the institution. 
There are also substantive reasons of why it 
must work this time, the most important being 
the answer given to so many current questions: 
globalisation. The rapidly growing economic 
and financial integration across the world has 
given rise to new challenges, many of which are 
of a macroeconomic nature. Global imbalances 
are one of them, others are the reinforced 
economic and financial transmission of shocks 
across countries, an increased need for structural 
change, and rising welfare coupled with rising 
inequality. The IMF has committed itself to 
tackling macroeconomic challenges related to 
this process, as its Managing Director has 
outlined a Medium-Term Strategy framed under 
the heading of globalisation and assisting 
member countries to deal with the challenges 
arising from it. Greater interlinkages and faster 
spillovers need a well-functioning international 
cooperation framework, which, on monetary, 
macroeconomic and financial matters, is offered 
predominantly by the IMF. The institution 
cannot afford, if it wants to continue serving its 
members, to be bound up in internal governance 
issues. 
As Buira (2005), Cottarelli (2005), De Gregorio 
et al. (1999), Kenen (2007), Truman (2006), 
Van Houtven (2002), Woods (2005) and a large 
number of other analysts note, the issue of 
quotas is central to reforming IMF governance, 
which again is central to strengthening the 
legitimacy and ultimately the effectiveness of 
the institution. Hence, the challenge of the 
current review is to design a better formula – 
simpler and more transparent – that ultimately 
ensures a country representation that is both 
efficient and fair, meaning that it has to follow 
sound economic principles and that it must give 
the less advantaged economies an adequate 
stake in the institution that affects them so 
importantly. This challenge is even more 
difficult than earlier in the history of the Fund 
because it is widely accepted that the institution 
as a whole does not need more liquidity and 
financial endowments. As a result, the quota 
adjustment cannot occur within a context of a 
large overall increase but has to take place 
under the constraint of an overall ceiling. 
* * *
The present paper does not claim to solve the 
Columbus’ egg conundrum. There even may not 
be a “silver bullet” formula that would convince 
the entire membership. However, there may be 
a simpler, more transparent formula that 
produces more intuitive and more equitable 
1 INTRODUCTION8
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results for the distribution of quotas across the 
membership. The paper aims to provide an 
extensive, comprehensive and hopefully useful 
overview of the various technical issues 
involved in choosing an appropriate quota 
formula. It offers a detailed analysis of the 
current quota system, illustrating its functioning 
and showing which countries and groups are 
most under and over-represented. It also puts 
forward an analysis of the various avenues of 
reform that are currently under discussion. To 
illustrate the main directions of the current 
reform efforts, it presents three benchmark 
formulae that could be useful in these 
discussions.
This paper has been motivated by ongoing work 
at the European Central Bank (ECB) on issues 
related to the IMF and the international 
monetary system. The ECB has also been asked 
to support EU Member States’ reflections on 
quota reform by providing technical analysis of 
different options through various simulations. 
The motivation to write the paper has been 
inspired by the analysis provided during 2006 
and 2007 to the Subcommittee on IMF and 
related issues (SCIMF) of the Economic and 
Financial Committee of the EU, and the 
numerous discussions with SCIMF members 
that offered helpful insights into this complex 
matter, which are gratefully acknowledged.   
The issue of quotas and IMF governance is also 
of interest to the ECB itself. The implications 
of the current debate on the set-up and the 
operation of the IMF will have an important 
bearing on the functioning of the international 
monetary system and the global economy, in 
which the euro area as the world’s largest 
trading partner and the euro as the world’s 
second international currency play a significant 
role and have an important stake. Although the 
euro area is not a member country of the IMF, 
all its participating countries are IMF members, 
and the ECB has observer status at the IMF’s 
Executive Board. Nevertheless, it should be 
stressed that any views expressed in this paper 
are solely those of the authors and should not 
be seen as the official views of the ECB.9
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2  THE ROLE OF QUOTAS AND THE MAIN 
ISSUES FOR REFORM
2.1  THE ROLE OF QUOTAS IN THE FUND
Quotas play an important role in all areas of the 
IMF. They determine a member’s contribution 
to the Fund’s resources, the access it has to IMF 
financial support in the event of balance of 
payments problems, and the share it receives in 
general SDR allocations. Quotas are also the 
overriding factor determining the voting rights 
of members in the institution and therefore 
decide the influence that individual members 
have in the IMF.4
While the Board tends to adopt decisions on a 
consensus basis and to avoid formal voting 
procedures, voting rights matter considerably 
in the daily business of the IMF. Most decisions 
have to be taken by a simple majority of the 
votes cast. However, for some decisions a 
majority of 70% or even 85% is required.5 
Hence even medium-sized members or smaller 
members can have an influential role in voting. 
For example, the decision to raise the quota of 
four emerging economies taken in Singapore in 
2006, which will be an important reference in 
this paper, required an 85% majority and was 
approved by just above 90%.
When a country joins the IMF, it is assigned a 
quota based on its relative economic position in 
the world economy. The Fund’s Articles of 
Agreement stipulate only that the quotas be 
determined by the Board of Governors (Article 
III Section 1); they do not specify how this 
should be done. In practice, the starting point 
for determining a country’s quota is the 
calculated quota share that results from applying 
a set of formulae that have been developed at 
the Fund for this purpose to economic data for 
that country. The set consists of five different 
formulae, some of them non-linear, which 
together include essentially four variables: the 
value of a country’s GDP, its external trade, its 
endowment with official reserves and 
fluctuations in its exports. The application of 
the formulae is complex and de facto different 
formulae apply to different countries, which 
makes a comparison of variables and weights 
across countries difficult.6 The complexity of 
the five-formulae framework is one of the root 
causes of the increasing dissatisfaction with the 
Fund’s approach to quota determination, as this 
framework is inherently intransparent.
Moreover, the outcome of the application of the 
formulae is just one element in the process of 
determining a country’s quota. Also entering 
the consideration is a comparison with the 
quotas of existing members that are considered 
to be broadly comparable in economic size and 
characteristics. And last but not least, the quota 
determination involves a political negotiation 
between the Fund and the respective member. 
Hence, the formulae only provide a general 
orientation for the size of the quota, while the 
ultimate decision is discretionary and political 
in nature. Accordingly, the history of the Fund 
is full of discussions on quotas in which the 
Board took deliberate departures from the 
formula.7 
4  According to the Articles of Agreement, each member has one 
vote for each 100,000 SDR of its quota plus 250 “basic votes”. 
Basic votes currently account for only 2% of total votes in the 
Fund. Since they are given in equal amounts to each member, 
they raise the share of the smallest members which have few 
quota-based votes, while lowering marginally the voting share 
of larger members, which have many quota-based votes.
5  Examples of decisions requiring an 85% majority are: an 
amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement; an adjustment 
of quotas; an allocation of SDRs; a change in obligatory periods 
for repurchase; and a sale of gold. Examples of decisions 
requiring a 70% majority are: a suspension or reinstatement of 
voting rights; the determination of rates of charge or 
remuneration.
6  See Chapter 3 for further details.
7  One of the earliest cases was in 1946, when the representative 
of Paraguay requested an increase in his country’s quota from 
2 million to 5 million US dollars. As the Fund historian writes, 
the respective director “sought to support the case by citing the 
formula”. This however did not impress the Board, which ruled 
“that the formula had no official standing in Bretton Woods and 
was merely used as a departure for negotiations”. After the 
negotiations, Paraguay received an increase to 3.5 million 
dollars (Horsefield, 1969, p. 150). De Vries (1985) reports that 
the first important quota increase of 1959 took place “with little 
reliance on the formula” (p. 515), whereas in the 1960s and 
1970s, “calculated quotas were heavily used in determining 
selective increases in quota” (p. 517).
2 THE ROLE OF 
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2.2  QUOTA ADJUSTMENTS IN THE PAST
Members’ quotas are not cast in stone forever 
but are reviewed periodically. Five-yearly 
general quota reviews are designed to ensure 
that the Fund continues to have sufficient 
resources to fulfil its mandate and that the 
distribution of quotas among members 
adequately reflects developments in the world 
economy. The quota reviews can therefore 
entail an augmentation of quotas and/or a 
redistribution of quota shares.
The Articles of Agreement provide for 
considerable flexibility in the adjustment of 
quotas. Quota increases can be conducted by 
the Board of Governors either in the context of 
the five-yearly general quota reviews or at any 
other point in time at the request of the members 
concerned (“ad hoc” increases). For both cases, 
the constraining factors are that any change 
requires an 85% majority of all votes, that a 
member’s quota cannot be changed without that 
member’s consent and that a quota increase 
should be justified by a need for additional 
funding. However, as mentioned, the Articles 
of Agreement do not stipulate how quotas 
should be adjusted and this can lead to 
adjustments not based on formulae. 
General quota increases in the context of the 
five-yearly reviews have been the main vehicle 
for adjustments in members’ quotas (Table 1). 
The bulk of these increases have typically had 
a large equiproportional element, meaning that 
quota increases were distributed in proportion 
to existing quota shares, leaving the quota 
distribution unchanged. However, there have 
been cases in which part of the increase was 
“selective”, i.e. given only to a subset of the 
membership so as to adjust the distribution of 
quota shares. These selective quota increases 
have generally been based on the results of the 
quota formulae. However, as quotas have never 
been reduced for “over-represented” countries, 
and have only been adjusted to some extent for 
“under-represented” countries, actual quota 
shares have shifted only very gradually in the 
direction of calculated quota shares. Gaps 
resulting from judgement exercised the past 
and fluctuations in the global economy have 
remained considerable for many members.
Table 1 General reviews of IMF quotas from 1951 to the present 
(in percentages) 
Source: IMF, Quota Distribution – Selected Issues, 17 July 2003. 
1) The February 1959 resolution provided for an equiproportional increase of 50% and special increases for three countries; the 
resolution adopted in April 1959 provided for special increases for 14 additional countries. 
2) The quota shares of the major oil exporters were doubled with the stipulation that the collective share of the developing countries 
would not fall. 
3) Currently under discussion. 
General review 
of quotas




Share of selective 
and ad hoc elements
First review March 1951 - - -
Second review January 1956 - - -
Special review  Feb./April 1959 1) 60.7 82.4 17.6
Third review December 1960 - - -
Fourth review March 1965 30.7 81.4 18.6
Fifth review February 1970 35.4 70.6 29.4
Sixth review March 1976 2) 33.6 - -
Seventh review December 1978 50.9 98.2 1.8
Eighth review March 1983 47.5 40.0 60.0
Ninth review June 1990 50.0 60.0 40.0
Tenth review January 1995 - -
11th review January 1998 45.0 75.0 25.0
12th review January 2003 - -
13th review to be concluded in 2008  3) to be determined to be determined11
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Ad hoc quota increases have been used at times 
to address an individual member’s relative 
position, especially in cases where a quota was 
considered particularly out of line with a 
country’s relative economic weight, or to reflect 
a major change in a country’s relationship with 
the Fund. There have been 19 ad hoc increases 
outside a general quota review, the bulk of 
which took place in the first two decades. The 
initial increases were to correct obvious 
anomalies in the early years of the Fund, for 
example raising quotas for those members 
whose initial quotas had been fixed at unduly 
low levels at the time of the Bretton Woods 
Conference. However, since the 1970s the 
Executive Board generally has concluded that 
ad hoc increases should normally be considered 
in the context of a general review. This position 
has been followed except in four ad hoc cases, 
where action was taken to address specific 
issues. Two of these – for China in 1980 and 
Cambodia in 1994 – were associated with the 
resumption of active relations with the Fund by 
these countries. The third increase, for Saudi 
Arabia in 1981, was associated with the very 
large-scale borrowing by the Fund from that 
member and also the fact that the member’s 
quota was low in relation to its relative economic 
size. The last ad hoc increase was for China in 
2001 following its resumption of sovereignty 
over Hong Kong.
In some previous quota reviews, selected 
members have voluntarily accepted a reduction 
in their quota shares (however, not absolute 
quotas). Such “sacrifices” have typically taken 
place in the context of an overall quota increase, 
when one member or a group of members have 
accepted a lower increase than they would have 
been entitled to. One example was the 
redistribution of quota shares among G7 
countries during the ninth general review in 
1990 to accommodate an increase in Japan’s 
quota such that the quota increases for the rest 
of the membership were unaffected.
A number of the general quota reviews have 
raised the issue of the quota formulae, and 
suggested reviewing whether the current 
formulae are still adequate for their purposes. 
Up to now, however, these discussions have 
been inconclusive, but they have certainly 
paved the way for the current review.8
2.3  THE CURRENT QUOTA REVIEW AND THE 
SINGAPORE RESOLUTION
The current quota review stands out from earlier 
reviews for a number of reasons. Fund officials 
as well as several member country officials and 
outside analysts have suggested that this review 
will be important not only for the internal 
governance but also for the credibility and 
universal role of the Fund. The review has 
started with the clear presumption that both the 
distribution of quotas in the Fund and the way 
quotas are determined are flawed, and that these 
flaws are detrimental to the credibility and 
effectiveness of the institution. Moreover, in 
contrast to earlier reviews, the problem of 
under-representation is now seen as affecting a 
very large number of members, including 
strategically important ones (such as China and 
emerging economies more broadly). Therefore, 
the Board of Governors explicitly and publicly 
called for a new framework to determine quotas 
in the Fund. Further to this, and again in contrast 
8  A Quota Formula Review Group was mandated in 1999 to 
provide an independent review of the quota formulae. The main 
recommendation of the group (see IMF 2000) was to have a 
single formula with only two variables: GDP as a measure of the 
ability to contribute resources to the Fund and variability of 
current receipts and long-term capital flows as a measure of 
external vulnerability, with GDP having about twice the weight 
of variability. Views in the Executive Board were split on this 
proposal, the main concern being that the suggested formula 
would lead to a greater concentration of quotas among the 
largest industrial countries and thus benefit in particular the 
United States. Moreover, the deletion of openness as a 
determinant of quotas was considered to be at odds with the 
Fund’s purpose to “facilitate the expansion and balanced growth 
of international trade”. The proposal was also widely criticised 
in the academic community, mainly for being biased against 
developing economies; see for example Buira (2001b).
  In subsequent discussions at the Executive Board after 2000, 
members were able to agree on some principles for an alternative 
quota formula, but continued to be divided on crucial details. It 
was generally endorsed that the new system should be simpler 
and more transparent and that it should entail three or four 
variables which are used in the existing quota formulae. No 
consensus emerged, however, on the exact definitions and 
weights. Views also diverged on whether or not to make 
discretionary changes to the outcome of a new quota formula 
and on how to strengthen the representation of developing 
countries.
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to earlier quota reviews, the current review has 
been put into the context of a “medium-term 
strategy” for the IMF, highlighting the need for 
improvements in quota allocation to safeguard 
the universal representation and strategic role 
of the IMF. All of this gives the quota reform a 
central place in determining the IMF’s future.
As far as the problem of inadequate 
representation in the Fund is concerned, the 
Managing Director used strong words to 
describe the problems: “The current allocation 
[of quotas and voice] puts this legitimacy at 
risk in many regions, for example in Africa, 
where the Fund is heavily engaged, and in Asia, 
whose place in the world economy has grown 
far more than its role in the Fund. … In the 
view of too many, governance and ownership 
imbalances in the Fund now rival global current 
account imbalances. Neither imbalance is 
sustainable.  … Such rebalancing may, at first 
glance, seem like a zero sum game, but all 
members will ultimately gain in belonging to an 
institution with greater legitimacy.” (September 
2005). 
This shows that in the assessment of IMF 
management the problem of representation in 
the Fund is not limited to Asia and other fast-
growing emerging market economies but 
includes also the representation of Africa and 
other developing economies, in which the Fund 
is heavily engaged. As we will see further 
below, there are therefore two distinct objectives 
in rebalancing quotas: an economic objective, 
i.e. to give greater weight to fast-growing 
emerging economies, and a political objective, 
i.e. to give a greater sense of ownership to 
developing economies that are more under the 
influence of Fund policies than many other 
members.9
In the course of 2006 the Managing Director 
was able to gather support for a package of 
reform measures, which was embraced in a 
resolution of the Board of Governors at the 
Annual Meetings in Singapore in September 
2006. This resolution (henceforth the “Singapore 
resolution”) is central to the current quota 
review and contains the following four 
elements:10 an ad hoc increase for four countries, 
guidance for a new quota formula, a call for a 
further ad hoc increase in quotas and a call for 
an increase in basic votes. These elements are 
taken up in the following sections.
2.3.1 INITIAL AD HOC INCREASE 
An initial ad hoc quota increase was agreed for 
four countries – China, Korea, Mexico and 
Turkey – and implemented immediately. These 
countries were selected because they were seen 
as most under-represented on the basis of the 
existing quota formulae and various filters used 
to further classify countries (GDP, openness, 
variability and reserves).11 Each of the four 
countries was given the equivalent of one-third 
of the difference between its actual quota share 
and the calculated quota share. The effect of 
this increase on the Fund’s total quotas was an 
increase of 1.8%. Table 2 shows the effect of 
the ad hoc increase for the four beneficiaries 
and certain other Fund members. Inevitably, 
this ad hoc increase lowered the quota shares of 
the countries that did not benefit from the 
increase, while their absolute quotas were left 
untouched. For example, the quota share of the 
euro area countries declined by 0.4 percentage 
points to 22.8% as a result of the increase of 
quotas for the four emerging economies. 
This ad hoc increase was intended as a first 
step, and was intentionally not high enough to 
resolve either the issue of under-representation 
for the four countries concerned or to address 
the broader picture of inadequate representation, 
9  The point that ownership is crucial in countries for which the 
Fund has an important impact on policies is made forcefully in 
Solimano (2001) and Birdsall (2003). The latter also argues that 
not only does the legitimacy of international organisations 
suffer from inadequate representation of developing economies, 
but also their effectiveness. Cottarelli (2005) provides an in-
depth discussion of the link between legitimacy and 
effectiveness.
10  It is worth noting that the Managing Director’s original intention 
was to also tackle issues related to the size and composition of 
the Board, to which he had referred in his September 2005 
report. However, this was not taken up in his report to the Board 
of Governors in 2006.
11  Ironically, China is one of only three countries in the history of 
the Fund that did not accept an increase in its quota. During the 
1960s it refused – along with Cuba and Panama – to take up a 
quota increase it was granted (Horsefield, 1969, p. 451).13
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in order to maintain the pressure for a 
compromise on a second ad hoc increase to be 
agreed upon by 2008. 
2.3.2 GUIDANCE FOR THE QUOTA REFORM 
PACKAGE 
The resolution also provides guidance for the 
work on a new quota formula, which is to be 
completed in a rather ambitious timeframe, 
namely “before the Annual Meetings 2007, and 
not later than the Spring Meetings 2008”. The 
resolution stipulates that the new formula 
should “provide a simpler and more transparent 
means of capturing a member’s relative position 
in the world economy”. It also mentions that a 
“significantly higher weight” should be given 
to GDP, “together with ensuring that other 
variables, in particular openness … also play 
an important role”. 
The resolution also commits the IMF to a 
second round of ad hoc increases for a broader 
range of countries and an increase in basic 
votes. This second round of increases will have 
to be based on the new formula. It will not, 
however, become effective until the amendment 
of the Articles of Agreement regarding the basic 
votes has entered into force. On the subject of 
basic votes, the resolution calls for at least a 
doubling and says that the increase will have to 
be sufficient to preserve the voting shares of 
low-income countries as a group. Both the 
second ad hoc quota increase and the basic vote 
increase are to be implemented by the Annual 
Meetings in 2007, and not later than by the 
Annual Meetings of 2008. 
2.4  OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN ISSUES AT STAKE
The guidance provided by the Singapore 
resolution for the new quota formula is relatively 
clear. Two objectives need to be met: (i) to 
agree on a simpler and more transparent 
formula, and (ii) to achieve a country 
representation that corresponds more closely to 
a judgemental assessment of relative weights in 
the global economy, while enhancing the 
ownership and voice of smaller and developing 
countries in the Fund.
Following this guidance will be challenging 
because of the mixture of economic and political 
reasoning as well as the large number of 
parameters of choice. Many variables are 
potential candidates for a formula to determine 
quotas at the IMF, in addition to GDP and 
openness. These include other variables 
currently used, namely the variability of export 
receipts (often suggested as a measure of 
vulnerability and hence potential need for IMF 
financing) and the level of official foreign 
exchange reserves. And there is no shortage of 
other candidates, ranging from financial 
openness to population. Moreover, the weights 
attached to each of the variables also need to be 
agreed, and there are “special” issues that need 
Table 2 Effects of the ad hoc quota increase decided in Singapore in 2006
Before ad hoc increase After ad hoc increase
Actual quota share Voting share Actual quota share Voting share
Beneficiaries 5.41 5.34 7.06 6.96
China 2.98 2.93 3.72 3.65
Mexico 1.21 1.20 1.45 1.43
Korea 0.76 0.76 1.35 1.33
Turkey 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.55
memo items:
Euro area 23.19 22.84 22.78 22.45
United States 17.38 17.03 17.08 16.74
Other countries 54.02 54.80 53.08 53.86
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: The voting share differs marginally from the actual quota share because the basic votes are added – of which each member 
receives the same amount – to the quota-dependent votes. 
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to be considered, such as international 
conversion rates (exchange rates or PPP), 
compression and basic votes.
The call for a simpler and more transparent 
formula can only be understood as a call for a 
single formula. This formula should include 
variables that are straightforward to compile 
across the membership, that are related to the 
purposes of the Fund and that can be easily 
communicated to the educated public. The 
desired country representation means that the 
formula cannot rely solely on economic weight 
(compared at market exchange rates) because 
this would marginalise the developing world. 
Possible ways to achieve a greater role for the 
developing world include using a “compression 
coefficient” (explained below), converting 
some variables not at market exchange rates but 
at PPP (which helps low-income countries with 
generally undervalued exchange rates), or 
significantly increasing the basic votes, which 
are allocated in equal number across members.
Chart 1 Four steps from economic weight to voice
Source: Authors’ presentation.
Note: See text for explanation.
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While an extensive analysis of the various 
parameters of a reform is provided in Chapter 
4, the following sections give an overview of 
some of the main elements. These elements can 
be divided analytically into four groups that 
correspond to the four steps needed to go from 
economic data to votes in the IMF (see also 
Chart 1):
1. First,  variables and weights must be chosen 
for the quota formula. The result of this step 
can be considered a first indicator of the 
economic weight of a country in the global 
economy, in a form that is relevant for the 
IMF. 
2. Second, it must be decided whether to 
adjust, in a transparent manner, the derived 
economic weights by applying a compression 
index. This step determines whether the 
economic weights are “compressed”, which 
shifts weight from larger to smaller 
economies. Without a compression index, 
economic weight enters the formula in a 
linear fashion. The result of this step is the 
calculated quota share.
3.  Third, the level of the actual quota share 
must be chosen, either taking the calculated 
quota share or accepting a deviation from 
the result of the quota formula. As explained 
above, the calculated quota share was in the 
past considered as only one indicator to 
determine the actual quota share.12
4.  Fourth, the amount of basic votes that is 
allocated to each member in equal number 
must be chosen. In addition to the actual 
quota, this represents the second pillar for 
determining the number of total votes with 
which a member is endowed and hence its 
voting rights.
The most important step is the first because it 
determines the ranking of members within the 
Fund, which cannot be changed by compression 
or basic votes. The latter two elements may be 
used to improve the relative position of smaller 
members, but they leave the ranking unchanged. 
Compression shifts weight from larger to 
smaller members, and basic votes water down 
the quota-based voting endowment. The only 
step that can change the relative position is a 
discretionary deviation of the actual quota share 
from the calculated quota share (step 3).
2.4.1 VARIABLES AND WEIGHTS 
The starting point for designing a quota formula 
and choosing variables and weights is the 
Singapore resolution.13 The call for a simpler 
and more transparent formula can only be read 
to imply a move to one single formula, 
abandoning the complex five-formula approach 
of the past, which is explained in more detail in 
Chapter 3. On the choice of functional form, 
there are the two options of additive and 
multiplicative formulae. Since their main 
properties are similar (discussed in Chapter 4), 
it seems favourable to opt for an additive 
formula, given the emphasis placed on 
transparency and easy communication.
In terms of variables, only GDP and openness 
are confirmed for a new formula; the possibility 
of other variables is implied, but none is referred 
to. Hence, the simplest formula compatible 
with the Singapore resolution would use only 
the two variables mentioned explicitly. A first 
illustrative formula could thus read:
Q1 = a· GDP + b· Openness
(where a+b=1)
The distribution of weights between GDP and 
openness is difficult to infer from the Singapore 
resolution, especially since the notion of a 
“higher weight” for GDP makes an implicit 
reference to the current weight. The latter, 
however, can only be inferred indirectly and 
12  For example, Korea’s calculated quota share of 2.5% is more 
than twice that of Saudi Arabia (1.0%), and yet in actual quota 
shares, Saudi Arabia has received an endowment of 3.2%, 
compared with 1.4% for Korea.
13  The resolution states that the new formula should “provide a 
simpler and more transparent means of capturing a member’s 
relative position in the world economy”. It also says, on 
variables and weights, that a “significantly higher weight” 
should be given to GDP and that it should be ensured that “other 
variables, in particular openness (…) also play an important 
role”.
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approximated. The estimates provided in 
Chapter 3 suggest that in the current five-
formula setting GDP and openness carry 
weights of 22% and 53% respectively. One 
option would be to increase the weight of GDP 
from 22% to 50%, while retaining an important 
role for openness at a weight of 50%. 
A second illustrative formula could retain all 
four variables currently used (noting also that 
the resolution speaks of variables other than 
GDP in the plural) and combine them into a 
single formula. This formula would read:
Q2 = c· GDP + d· Openness + e· Variability + 
f ·Reserves 
(where c+d+e+f=1)
This formula would be closest to the current 
method of calculating quotas at the IMF, yet 
provide a simpler and more transparent 
framework. 
The resolution leaves open whether GDP should 
continue to be converted at market exchange 
rates or whether PPP comparisons should also 
receive consideration. A third illustrative 
formula could take GDP on board not only at 
market prices (as currently measured) but also 
measured in PPP terms. Given nominally 
undervalued exchange rates in lower-income 
countries – the well-known Balassa-Samuelson 
effect – a move towards PPP would shift quotas 
from higher income countries to lower income 
countries. Openness could be retained with the 
same weight as GDP, whereas variability and 
reserves could be dropped in order to limit the 
number of variables and to create room for a 
GDP weight measured in PPP terms.
Q3 = g ·GDP + h· Openness + i ·GDP in PPP
(where g+h+i=1 and g=h)
Hence, the total number of variables under 
overall consideration would be five – the 
current four plus GDP in PPP terms.
KEY CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING VARIOUS 
VARIABLES
What would justify the choice of the above 
variables, besides the formal argument of their 
being mentioned in the Singapore resolution, 
and what justifies leaving out some of the other 
variables that are often referred to in the policy 
discussion? The case for the two main variables 
is relatively straightforward:
–  GDP is the most widely used measure of 
economic size, readily available for all 
members and easy to communicate to the 
general public.
–  Openness – the sum of exports and imports 
– corresponds most closely to one of the 
core objectives of the Fund, namely to 
facilitate the growth of international trade.14 
Moreover, openness reflects the stakes of 
members in the global economy and is hence 
an indicator of their willingness to cooperate. 
As with GDP, data are readily available for 
all members and are easy to communicate to 
the general public.
The case for all other variables is less clear-
cut:
–  Variability is a variable used in the past, but 
its definition (fluctuations in export receipts 
“over a recent 13-year period”) is arbitrary, 
it is not intuitive and it could even be seen 
as rewarding volatile policies or market 
developments. Moreover, variability 
measured as absolute variations in export 
receipts favours advanced economies 
because they have not only the largest trade 
volumes, especially when converted into 
international currencies, but also the largest 
absolute swings, due to either market 
developments, exogenous shocks or large 
exchange rate variations. What is more, 
such variability in the international trade of 
advanced economies would not induce these 
countries to draw on the Fund. Hence the 
14  Article I of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement gives “to facilitate 
the expansion and balanced growth of international trade” as 
one of the main purposes of the institution.17
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ultimate argument that variability captures 
vulnerability and hence the potential need 
for IMF financial assistance is of limited 
relevance.15 
–  Reserves, i.e. official foreign exchange 
reserves, are a variable whose inclusion is 
more difficult to justify today than when the 
Fund was founded, partly because some of 
the most recent accumulation has taken 
place in the context of deliberate policy 
choices in connection with insufficient 
flexibility of exchange rate levels.16 The 
inclusion of reserves in the formula hence 
can be seen as rewarding such policies. 
Capping reserves would be a way around 
this problem, but thresholds are difficult to 
set and may need to vary among countries. 
Therefore most simulations assign only a 
small weight to reserves, in the 
neighbourhood of the current weight of 
about 5%.
–  PPP conversions for GDP or other variables, 
rather than conversions based on market 
exchange rates, have some economic 
validity, especially when comparing 
economic welfare across countries. Such 
conversions are also used in the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook to make the 
comparison of the volume of goods and 
services for final consumption easier. 
However, in view of the Fund’s role as a 
financial institution, PPP conversion cannot 
be considered as generally appropriate for 
inclusion in a quota formula that should 
stand the test of time. Nevertheless, it must 
be acknowledged that market exchange 
rates favour high-income economies, and 
the inclusion of PPP would divert influence 
away from advanced countries.
–  Openness in financial variables, through 
the inclusion of either stocks or flows, is 
clearly a desirable concept over the longer 
term, given the ever increasing role of 
financial transactions in the world economy. 
However, at the current juncture data are 
still missing for many members and there 
are still significantly more open issues with 
regard to data quality and comparability 
than for trade data. The variable would 
favour advanced economies – more so when 
employing stocks than when using flows – 
as they are more integrated internationally, 
given that for most developing economies, 
the degree of international financial 
integration is still negligible.
–  Population has democratic appeal but seems 
difficult to justify in a financial institution. 
Moreover, the high correlation with PPP 
would suggest that a population aspect 
could be captured by PPP.
2.4.2 CHOICE OF COMPRESSION INDEX
A decision to be made is whether or not to 
introduce compression when translating 
economic weight into quotas. So far, the Fund 
has not implemented it, although it was 
considered at Bretton Woods in 1944. It has 
instead opted for basic votes in its decision-
making process as a way to make a politically 
determined adjustment to the economic data. 
Both mechanisms have their justification, 
separately as well as jointly. Basic votes 
essentially affect the lower end of the quota 
spectrum and have a very significant effect on 
mainly the smallest members. They give an 
initial endowment to members that would 
otherwise be truly negligible in any voting 
process because of their reduced economic 
weight. However, any reasonable absolute 
endowment of basic votes has hardly any effect 
on the distribution of votes among larger 
15 The idea of excluding variability is at least 25 years old. 
Boughton (2001) reports on Board discussions in 1982, in 
which it was noticed that “in practice the link between variability 
and demand for Fund resources was not all that strong, and 
some directors saw this variable as a source of distortion in the 
distribution.” A majority of the Board favoured dropping this 
variable, but the Managing Director dissuaded the Board from 
doing so, “primarily on the grounds that the oil-exporters at the 
time were important contributors to the supply of liquid assets 
to the Fund” (p. 863). Given fluctuations in oil prices, especially 
in the early 1980s, variability of exports boosted the quotas of 
oil exporting members.
16 For example, some countries have openly acknowledged the 
existence of excess reserves and have initiated the creation of a 
new institution (a so-called sovereign wealth fund) outside the 
central bank to manage these excess reserves.
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members because the relative importance of 
the basic votes is negligible. In contrast, 
compression works mainly at the upper end of 
the quota spectrum and is important for large 
members because it implies that the marginal 
increase resulting from an increase in the value 
of the determinant variables falls for higher 
quota levels. Hence, compression shifts quota 
very significantly from the very largest members 
of the organisation to the smaller ones.
To balance the economic rationale of principle-
based variables with the political objective of 
giving non-advanced countries a greater say, 
we include a compression of 0.9 in our 
illustrative formulae. This may be considered 
as noticeable for smaller members and still 
tolerable for the larger ones. In particular, such 
a value would bring the calculated quota share 
of the largest member more in line with political 
declarations that the United States will not seek 
to increase its share in the Fund above pre-
Singapore levels.17
2.4.3 DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF BASIC 
VOTES
When the Fund was established, basic votes 
amounted to 11% of total votes. In subsequent 
years, when new members joined without a 
general quota increase, this share rose to a peak 
of around 16% in the late 1950s and from then 
onwards continuously declined to only 2% 
today.18 The reason is that the absolute number 
of basic votes has been left unchanged at 250 
votes per member, while the total quota and 
financial size of the Fund has risen considerably. 
The guideline given in the Singapore resolution 
that a greater weight should be given to GDP, if 
based mainly or entirely on market exchange 
rates, would reduce the voice of the smaller 
economies even more. The Board of Governors 
therefore expressly stipulated that basic votes 
would also need to at least double.19
Simulations illustrate that a doubling of basic 
votes would only cancel out the worsening of 
the positions of low-income countries resulting 
from a larger GDP weight in the formula; it 
would not improve their standing within the 
Fund. How far should basic votes be raised? If 
the membership seriously wants to improve the 
standing of low-income countries with a new 
formula, basic votes may have to rise to around 
1,000 or even 1,500. At the latter level, their 
share in total votes would be brought back to 
that in the early years of the Fund, namely 
around 11%.20 The examples chosen here 
include raising basic votes to 1,000 in 
combination with the formulae that are based 
only on market exchange rates and raising them 
to 500 in combination with the formula that 
includes PPP conversions.
2.5 THREE  ILLUSTRATIVE  FORMULAE
On the basis of the above considerations, taking 
the three above-mentioned illustrative formulae 
and setting, for illustrative purposes, coefficients 
for the weights of the variables and the 
compression factor as well as new levels for 
basic votes would deliver the scenarios 
summarised in Table 3 below. Any of these 
three formulae would bring improvements 
compared with the status quo. They all are 
much simpler and more transparent than the 
current framework for quota calculations. 
Instead of five different formulae, only one 
formula would be applied to all members, and 
all variables would be applied to all members 
in the same way. The new formula, in which 
variables enter in the form of shares rather than 
absolute levels, would also be more transparent 
since explicit weights do not diverge from the 
implicit weights.
17 US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson stated that the 
United States is “firmly on record to forego any share increase”. 
Such an increase could arise from raising the weight of GDP in 
the formula, which would benefit the United States. Source: 
Statement by Mr Paulson to the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee of the IMF, 17 September 2006.
18  Table 16 in Chapter 3.3 provides an overview of the relationship 
between basic votes and total votes over time.
19  Buira (2001a) makes an institutional argument for spreading 
voting shares more equally, arguing that “a concentration of 
power in a few countries impairs the transparency and political 
accountability of the Fund”. He also says that a better 
distribution of voting shares would help to ensure the good use 
of public resources.
20  If one wanted to raise the share of basic votes in total votes to 
15.6% as was the case at the peak in the history of the Fund, one 
would have to allocate 2,185 basic votes to each member.19
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How can these three formulae be assessed (see 
Table 4)? Formula 1 may be the easiest to 
communicate: two variables capture the 
economic weight and a compression coefficient 
reflects equity considerations; this could be 
coupled with a substantial increase in basic 
votes to foster the voice of the smallest 
members. Formula 2 is easy to communicate 
mainly in the sense that the structure of the 
variables remains broadly unchanged from the 
present. However, at least two of the variables 
– variability and reserves – are difficult to 
justify. The third formula would include a 
partial PPP conversion for GDP to reduce a 
possible bias of market exchange rates towards 
developed economies; the increase in basic 
votes could then be limited to 500.
An important feature of the first and third 
formulae is that they correspond most closely 
to what people actually observe in the global 
economy: general economic growth reflected in 
GDP and growing trade integration reflected in 
rising openness. Hence, the probability that 
over the longer term a difference will emerge 
between actual quota shares and the perceived 
distribution of weight in the global economy is 
minimal. Variability and official reserves, by 
contrast, are much less directly observable or 
less perceived by general observers. Hence 
risks of gaps between perception and actual 
quota shares may be somewhat higher in the 
second formula.
The implications of these three formulae for the 
distribution of quota shares and voting shares 
among selected members are illustrated in 
Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 give the actual quota 
share and the voting share of today, columns 3, 
7, and 11 show the calculated quota share based 
on the respective formula, columns 4, 8, and 12 
indicate whether absolute under or over-
representation exceeds 0.2 percentage point, 
columns 5, 9, and 13 give the associated voting 
shares of the members, and columns 6, 10, and 
14 compare old and new voting shares and 
Table 3 Three illustrative formulae consistent with the Singapore resolution
No Formula Basic votes
1 Q1 = (0.5 GDP + 0.5 Openness)0.9 1,000
2 Q2 = (0.5 GDP + 0.3 Openness + 0.15 Variability + 0.05 Reserves)0.9 1,000
3 Q3 = (0.4 GDP + 0.4 Openness + 0.2 GDP at PPP)0.9 500
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: For a discussion of these formulae see text. The necessary rescaling factor, which ensures that the shares of all members sum up 
to 100%, is not shown purely for simplicity reasons.
Table 4 Formula checklist
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Formula 1 Formula 2 Formula 3 Comment
Simple Yes Limited yes Yes No reduction in the number 
of variables in Formula 2
Transparent Yes Limited yes Yes Variability concept and 
definition not easy to grasp
Easy to update  Yes Yes Yes
Robust against risk of a gap between 
perceived and actual quota 
Yes No Yes Variability not directly 
observable
In line with Singapore resolution Yes Yes Yes
Per memoriam:
Sum of all negative or positive absolute 
deviations from results under the current 
five-formula system (in percentage points) 7.0 7.7 8.5
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Table 5 Three illustrative formulae: Effects on calculated quota shares and voting shares 
(assumptions: total quota increase of 5%; basic votes increased to 1,000 (500))
Source: Authors’ calculation.





















































123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
Euro area 22.89 22.56 27.35 + 22.00 - 24.96 + 21.83 - 24.34 + 22.28 -
Germany 5.98 5.87 6.94 + 5.69 - 6.29 + 5.62 - 6.24 + 5.80 -
France 4.94 4.84 4.57 - 4.39 - 4.14 - 4.39 - 4.25 - 4.54 -
Italy 3.24 3.19 3.94 + 3.12 - 3.50 + 3.08 - 3.75 + 3.21 0
Netherlands 2.37 2.33 2.50 0 2.25 - 2.05 - 2.13 - 2.02 - 2.19 -
Belgium 2.12 2.08 1.82 - 1.91 - 1.60 - 1.91 - 1.43 - 1.96 -
Spain 1.40 1.38 2.65 + 1.49 + 2.40 + 1.48 + 2.49 + 1.52 +
Austria 0.86 0.85 1.17 + 0.87 0 1.01 0 0.86 0 0.99 0 0.87 0
Finland 0.58 0.58 0.65 0 0.59 0 0.63 0 0.58 0 0.57 0 0.57 0
Portugal 0.40 0.40 0.60 + 0.43 0 0.55 0 0.43 0 0.55 0 0.43 0
Ireland 0.39 0.39 1.14 + 0.49 + 1.26 + 0.53 + 0.87 + 0.46 +
Greece 0.38 0.38 0.67 + 0.43 0 0.71 + 0.44 + 0.66 + 0.42 0
Luxembourg 0.13 0.14 0.53 + 0.21 + 0.68 + 0.24 + 0.37 + 0.18 0
Slovenia 0.11 0.12 0.16 0 0.15 0 0.15 0 0.15 0 0.14 0 0.13 0
Total EU 32.36 31.99 37.72 + 31.44 - 34.55 + 31.01 - 33.68 + 31.52 -
United Kingdom 4.94 4.84 5.35 + 4.66 - 4.61 - 4.39 - 4.82 0 4.65 -
Sweden 1.10 1.09 1.22 0 1.07 0 1.11 0 1.06 0 1.04 0 1.03 -
Denmark 0.76 0.75 0.92 0 0.76 0 0.96 + 0.77 0 0.77 0 0.75 0
Poland 0.63 0.63 0.83 0 0.65 0 0.86 + 0.66 0 0.84 + 0.66 0
Hungary 0.48 0.48 0.48 0 0.48 0 0.46 0 0.47 0 0.43 0 0.46 0
Romania 0.47 0.47 0.29 0 0.46 0 0.30 0 0.46 0 0.30 0 0.45 0
Czech Republic 0.38 0.38 0.53 0 0.41 0 0.53 0 0.41 0 0.47 0 0.40 0
Bulgaria 0.29 0.30 0.13 0 0.30 0 0.14 0 0.30 0 0.13 0 0.29 0
Slovakia 0.16 0.17 0.23 0 0.20 0 0.23 0 0.20 0 0.20 0 0.18 0
Lithuania 0.07 0.08 0.11 0 0.11 0 0.11 0 0.11 0 0.11 0 0.09 0
Cyprus 0.06 0.07 0.08 0 0.10 0 0.08 0 0.10 0 0.07 0 0.08 0
Latvia 0.06 0.07 0.07 0 0.10 0 0.07 0 0.10 0 0.07 0 0.08 0
Malta 0.05 0.06 0.05 0 0.08 0 0.05 0 0.08 0 0.04 0 0.06 0
Estonia 0.03 0.04 0.08 0 0.07 0 0.07 0 0.07 0 0.07 0 0.06 0
G7 45.22 44.35 49.14 + 42.40 - 47.53 + 42.10 - 48.20 + 43.71 -
United States 17.08 16.73 18.03 + 15.95 - 18.11 + 15.99 - 18.87 + 16.69 0
Japan 6.12 6.00 7.39 + 5.85 - 8.24 + 6.01 0 7.62 + 6.12 +
Canada 2.93 2.88 2.92 0 2.75 - 2.65 - 2.62 - 2.66 - 2.70 -
18 main EMEs 21.98 21.73 20.87 - 20.98 - 22.40 + 21.29 - 24.01 + 21.98 +
China 3.72 3.65 5.11 + 3.65 0 5.40 + 3.73 + 6.74 + 4.02 +
India 1.91 1.88 1.49 - 1.72 - 1.57 - 1.72 - 2.40 + 1.93 0
Indonesia 0.96 0.95 0.78 0 0.88 - 0.83 0 0.88 - 0.97 0 0.94 0
Korea 1.35 1.33 2.09 + 1.37 0 2.25 + 1.42 + 1.97 + 1.40 +
Malaysia 0.68 0.68 0.82 0 0.69 0 0.87 0 0.70 0 0.68 0 0.68 0
Thailand 0.50 0.50 0.76 + 0.53 0 0.81 + 0.55 0 0.76 + 0.54 0
Philippines 0.40 0.41 0.43 0 0.42 0 0.46 0 0.42 0 0.48 0 0.42 0
Singapore 0.40 0.40 0.89 + 0.47 + 1.08 + 0.51 + 0.66 + 0.44 0
Vietnam 0.15 0.16 0.24 0 0.19 0 0.22 0 0.19 0 0.28 0 0.18 0
Brazil 1.40 1.38 1.35 0 1.29 - 1.52 0 1.35 0 1.69 + 1.40 0
Mexico 1.45 1.43 1.93 + 1.44 0 1.93 + 1.45 0 1.90 + 1.48 0
Argentina 0.97 0.96 0.45 - 0.90 - 0.56 - 0.90 - 0.56 - 0.91 -
Chile 0.39 0.40 0.34 0 0.39 0 0.36 0 0.39 0 0.35 0 0.38 0
Colombia 0.36 0.36 0.29 0 0.35 0 0.31 0 0.35 0 0.37 0 0.37 0
Saudi Arabia 3.21 3.16 0.87 - 2.87 - 0.85 - 2.87 - 0.81 - 2.96 -
Russia 2.73 2.69 1.59 - 2.45 - 1.80 - 2.45 - 1.80 - 2.52 -
Turkey 0.55 0.55 0.85 + 0.58 0 1.00 + 0.61 + 0.89 + 0.60 0
South Africa 0.86 0.85 0.60 - 0.80 - 0.60 - 0.80 - 0.70 0 0.81 0
Rest of the world 19.54 20.67 13.07 - 23.03 + 14.05 - 23.07 + 13.16 - 20.99 +
ROW: Developing 14.79 15.94 8.43 - 18.44 + 9.45 - 18.50 + 9.00 - 16.42 +
African Constit.-19 2.85 3.00 1.45 - 3.28 + 1.58 - 3.29 + 1.63 - 3.01 0
African Constit.-24 1.14 1.38 0.53 - 1.98 + 0.59 - 1.98 + 0.58 - 1.55 +21
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indicate whether the absolute difference exceeds 
0.05 percentage point. Countries’ shares in the 
variables are given in Table 6.
Policy-makers that do not find the resulting 
representation adequate have two main 
parameters of choice, which affect members in 
a broadly similar way, namely the size of the 
compression index and the number of basic 
votes. And they have the option to shift the 
weights assigned to the variables, which will 
also affect the quota distribution among the 
members, as different variables matter 
differently for individual countries. 
2 THE ROLE OF 
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Table 6 Variables entering the formulae: Countries’ shares in global totals
Actual 
quota share
GDP Openness Variability Reserves Purchasing 
power parity
share share share share share
Euro area 22.89 22.83 32.11 23.67 5.03 15.44
Germany 5.98 6.55 8.66 6.02 1.42 4.31
France 4.94 4.54 5.02 3.16 1.00 3.11
Italy 3.24 4.11 4.00 1.83 0.82 2.87
Netherlands 2.37 1.46 3.43 1.32 0.30 0.86
Belgium 2.12 0.86 2.59 1.88 0.26 0.55
Spain 1.40 2.51 2.71 1.74 0.29 1.83
Austria 0.86 0.70 1.41 0.73 0.21 0.47
Finland 0.58 0.45 0.65 0.64 0.28 0.28
Portugal 0.40 0.42 0.58 0.42 0.14 0.35
Ireland 0.39 0.44 1.60 2.97 0.06 0.28
Greece 0.38 0.63 0.51 0.88 0.03 0.42
Luxembourg 0.13 0.08 0.80 1.99 0.01 0.05
Slovenia 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.22 0.07
Total EU 32.36 31.00 43.74 31.26 11.42 21.51
United Kingdom 4.94 5.09 6.31 2.38 1.05 3.10
Sweden 1.10 0.83 1.37 0.95 0.59 0.45
Denmark 0.76 0.59 1.02 1.34 0.98 0.32
Poland 0.63 0.63 0.80 0.95 1.06 0.83
Hungary 0.48 0.24 0.55 0.46 0.46 0.28
Romania 0.47 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.48 0.31
Czech Republic 0.38 0.27 0.62 0.58 0.77 0.31
Bulgaria 0.29 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.12
Slovakia 0.16 0.10 0.24 0.17 0.42 0.14
Lithuania 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08
Cyprus 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.03
Latvia 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
Malta 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01
Estonia 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04
G7 45.22 62.64 47.72 43.27 29.54 42.33
United States 17.08 28.89 15.05 20.73 2.06 20.47
Japan 6.12 11.00 5.31 6.87 22.28 6.62
Canada 2.93 2.46 3.37 2.28 0.92 1.86
18 main EMEs 21.98 18.00 21.03 23.39 47.40 38.18
China 3.72 5.23 5.61 3.38 19.45 15.22
India 1.91 1.66 1.09 0.86 3.63 5.87
Indonesia 0.96 0.64 0.70 1.00 0.87 1.60
Korea 1.35 1.71 2.31 2.41 5.51 1.65
Malaysia 0.68 0.29 1.12 1.21 1.98 0.47
Thailand 0.50 0.40 0.91 1.10 1.29 0.90
Philippines 0.40 0.22 0.47 0.71 0.41 0.68
Singapore 0.40 0.26 1.28 1.97 3.07 0.20
Vietnam 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.12 0.22 0.41
Brazil 1.40 1.56 0.90 1.89 1.56 2.63
Mexico 1.45 1.72 1.95 2.06 1.80 1.79
Argentina 0.97 0.38 0.35 0.94 0.62 0.86
Chile 0.39 0.23 0.31 0.38 0.43 0.32
Colombia 0.36 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.37 0.56
Saudi Arabia 3.21 0.64 0.87 0.81 0.68 0.58
Russia 2.73 1.46 1.49 2.18 3.95 2.57
Turkey 0.55 0.74 0.73 1.57 1.11 0.93
South Africa 0.86 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.44 0.95
Rest of the world 19.54 8.65 11.50 15.47 15.92 11.38
ROW: Developing 14.79 5.04 6.89 10.95 11.56 9.13
African Constit.-19 2.85 0.99 1.16 1.70 1.61 1.90
African Constit.-24 1.14 0.26 0.38 0.65 0.32 0.54
Source: Authors’ calculation.23
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3  AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT QUOTA 
SYSTEM
3.1  THE ISSUE OF UNDER AND OVER-
REPRESENTATION
The widespread view that the actual quota shares 
of many countries in the Fund no longer reflect 
their weight in the global economy is at the core 
of the current debate. Specifically, there are three 
main facets to this view: first, that emerging 
market economies, which have grown 
significantly in recent years and increasingly 
play a systemic role, are under-represented in the 
Fund; second, that developing economies have 
been unduly marginalised in Fund’s decision-
making; and third, that advanced economies, 
especially in Europe, are generally over-
represented.
It is remarkable to note that all three 
aforementioned perceptions are factually 
incorrect, at least on the basis of the current quota 
formulae system. Emerging market economies as 
a group are not under-represented; developing 
economies are actually over-represented; and 
advanced economies, including many European 
economies, are if anything under-represented 
(see Chart 2). This is the result that emerges when 
countries’ actual quota shares are compared with 
calculated shares, i.e. when the existing quota 
formulae are applied to the most recent economic 
data.21 Of course, analysis by country groupings 
does not allow judgement of the situation for 
individual countries; information on this will be 
presented in greater detail below.
When entering the current debate, it is therefore 
important to fully understand the facts and look 
closely into the details of under and over-
representation. What exactly is the status quo, 
which countries are under or over-represented 
in the current system, and by which measure? 
The following sections will first consider some 
general trends and then turn to the different 
country groupings and individual countries.
Under and over-representation is defined as the 
deviation of a country’s actual quota share in 
the Fund from its calculated quota share. In the 
absence of an agreement on a new quota 
formula, the calculated quota share is that 
which would result from applying the existing 
five-formula system to the most recent economic 
data. 
Since the current debate is about countries’ 
positions in the Fund, the main discussions 
concentrate on quota shares, i.e. the relative 
positions of countries within the Fund, rather 
than the absolute value of their subscriptions to 
the institution. If one were to consider the 
absolute value of countries’ subscriptions and 
compare them with the absolute quotas resulting 
from the formulae, virtually all IMF members22  
would be “under-represented” because in recent 
Chart 2 Under or over-represented? Actual 




Notes:  Other advanced economies comprises: Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, San 
Marino and Switzerland. Main emerging market economies 
(EMEs) comprises: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, 



























21  This is why some it is argued in some quarters that the current 
five-formula system ought to be changed on the grounds that it 
no longer reflects reality. These issues will be taken up in 
Chapter 4 when analysing the issues at stake in the current quota 
reform.  
22  Only 12 countries are over-represented (while 173 are under-
represented) when actual quotas are compared with calculated 
quotas (both in SDR millions): Burundi, the Central African 
Republic, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, 
Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. All of these countries are located in 
Africa, and a majority have suffered from civil war or unrest in 
recent times. This contrasts with 129 over-represented countries 
(and 56 under-represented) when actual quota shares and 
calculated quota shares are compared.
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decades their economies have grown much 
more significantly than the absolute size of the 
Fund.23
How serious is the issue of under and over-
representation for the countries and for the 
Fund? There are different ways to look at this 
question. The gap between a country’s actual 
and calculated quota shares can be expressed 
either in absolute terms (actual minus calculated 
quota share) or in relative terms (actual minus 
calculated quota share as a percentage of the 
calculated quota share). Both measures have 
their validity and show different perspectives. 
The absolute measure illustrates the significance 
of the problem of under or over-representation 
from, particularly the Fund’s perspective, as it 
shows the respective amounts of quota share 
that would need to be redistributed to align 
representation. At present, the absolute gaps of 
all under-represented IMF members add up to 
15.5 percentage points of the Fund’s total quota 
(corresponding to SDR 33.7 billion); by 
definition, the same overall gap can be computed 
for the over-represented countries. This means 
that the Fund would have to shift 15.5% of its 
quota internally if it wanted to consistently 
eliminate all cases of under and over-
representation at the current level of total 
quota. In practice, of course, quota shares have 
been modestly rebalanced by increases in 
overall quota allocated to a certain group of 
countries, not by redistribution. Moreover, 
all past quota adjustments have only been 
partial, i.e. narrowing but not closing any 
under-representation gaps. Such moves are 
less difficult in political terms as they mean 
that no member would has to give up quota in 
absolute terms, but they of course lengthen the 
period of adjustment of under and over-
representation.
Relative measures of under or over-
representation show the significance of the 
problem mainly from the country’s perspective 
and also allow countries of different size to be 
compared. When discussing which countries 
are seriously under or over-represented, it is 
helpful to consider the two concepts together, 
since small countries with low quota shares can 
never reach significant levels of absolute 
gaps. 
Chart 3 ranks the 185 IMF member countries 
according to their relative position of under or 
over-representation, formally expressed as 
(AQS-CQS)/CQS. The most under-represented 
country, Luxembourg, is ranked first on the far 
left-hand side, while the most over-represented 
country, Somalia, is ranked 185th on the far 
right-hand side. As can be seen, far more 
countries are over-represented (129 countries) 
than under-represented (56 countries). Hence, 
although the political pressure comes mainly 
from cases of under-representation, in terms of 
numbers, the Fund is facing a much more 
significant issue of over-representation.
Chart 4 illustrates the gaps in terms of SDR 
between the actual quotas and a hypothetical 
situation characterised by the absence of any 
Chart 3 Relative under or over-
representation of all IMF members 
(in percentages)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: The chart plots relative under or over-representation, 
formally expressed as actual quota share minus calculated 
quota share divided by the calculated quota share. Points above 
the horizontal axis show over-represented countries; points 
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23  The last time actual quotas were broadly in balance with total 
calculated quotas was in the 1970s. Since then, the difference 
has increased quite substantially. Today, the size of the Fund, 
equivalent to the sum of all members’ actual quotas, is SDR 
217.6 billion. The calculated quotas, by contrast, would add up 
to SDR 1,139.7 billion, i.e. roughly 5.2 times the former. Of 
course, this number is purely indicative, as nobody is arguing 
that the overall financial size of the IMF should be raised by 
420%.25
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under and over-representation, i.e. the Fund’s 
current total quota is distributed among 
members according to their respective calculated 
quota shares. It can be seen that for several 
countries the difference is quite significant, at 
times exceeding SDR 1 billion. For example, 
Saudi Arabia’s quota is SDR 4.7 billion in 
excess of what its calculated share in the Fund’s 
total quota would suggest. At the other end of 
the spectrum, China’s quota falls short by SDR 
5.3 billion. However, for 78% of all IMF 
members the gap is SDR 400 million or less.
Table 7 lists the absolute gaps in quotas for the 
20 most over-represented and most under-
represented countries. Less than half of the 20 
most under-represented countries are emerging 
market economies; all others are advanced 
economies. Furthermore, as many as 17 out of 
the 20 most over-represented members are 
emerging or developing economies. Only three 
advanced economies are members of this group. 
This illustrates that, on the current metric, 
Chart 4 Absolute under or over-




Note: The chart plots absolute under or over-representation of 
all IMF members transposed into SDR terms. Points above the 
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Table 7 The IMF’s 20 most under-represented and over-represented members
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: Data show the gap between the actual quota and a hypothetical quota that would bring the actual quota share in line with the 
calculated quota share.
Most under-represented members Most over-represented members
SDR millions SDR millions
1 China -5,260 1 Saudi Arabia 4,745
2 Singapore -3,334 2 Russia 2,243
3 Ireland -2,772 3 France 1,757
4 Luxembourg -2,700 4 Venezuela 1,730
5 Korea -2,538 5 United States 1,722
6 Japan -1,941 6 India 1,358
7 Germany -1,894 7 Argentina 1,316
8 Spain -1,818 8 Nigeria 972
9 Malaysia -1,503 9 South Africa 870
10 Netherlands -1,141 10 Ukraine 717
11 Thailand -897 11 Brazil 710
12 Mexico -852 12 Australia 615
13 United Kingdom -661 13 Kuwait 609
14 Denmark -620 14 Pakistan 608
15 Austria -583 15 Libya 596
16 United Arab Emirates -494 16 Iraq 584
17 Czech Republic -454 17 Iran 550
18 Turkey -442 18 Algeria 516
19 Belgium -334 19 Romania 491
20 Poland -326 20 Congo, Kinshasa 484
Sum of top 20 -30,562 Sum of top 20 23,191
Sum of all under-represented members -33,660 Sum of all over-represented members 33,660
per memoriam: 
Total IMF quota: 217,556
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under and over-representation cuts through all 
country groups.
Given ongoing economic developments, a 
country’s calculated quota relative to that of 
other members fluctuates over time. Hence if 
any deviation, however small, were to qualify 
as under or over-representation, practically all 
members would fall into this group, i.e. 56 
countries would classify as under-represented 
and 129 as over-represented. In order to capture 
the most important cases of under and over-
representation, one needs to set a threshold 
beyond which deviations are defined as under 
or over-representation, and below which 
representation is considered as “broadly in 
line” with the country’s calculated quota share. 
Setting such thresholds is necessarily arbitrary 
and depends on the purpose of the analysis. 
Various absolute and relative thresholds shown 
in Table 8 illustrate the pattern of under and 
over-representation. From this overview it 
becomes clear that meaningful thresholds are 
needed. If the thresholds are too low, more than 
half of the membership would be considered 
misrepresented, due to the high number of over-
represented countries.
For example, if all cases in which the gap 
exceeded 10% of the country’s calculated quota 
share were taken as misrepresented, almost the 
entire membership would fall into this group, 
with 45 countries being under-represented and 
122 being over-represented. Even when this 
relative threshold is raised, the number of over-
represented countries hardly falls; the large 
number of over-represented countries can also 
be seen in Chart 3 above. As we will see later, 
these are mainly smaller developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, whose calculated quota 
share has fallen in relative terms as they have 
benefited less from strong global GDP growth 
(especially when measured in international 
currencies), rising trade integration and growing 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Table 8 also illustrates that, among the under-
represented countries, five countries are have a 
large absolute deviation of more than -0.9 
percentage point of IMF quota, whereas only 




Absolute deviation Relative deviation
percentage points No. of members percentages No. of members
-0.10 23 -10 45
-0.15 19 -15 38
-0.20 18 -20 32
-0.25 15 -25 25
-0.30 13 -30 22
-0.50 10 -50 8
-0.90 5 -90 1
b) Over-representation
Absolute deviation Relative deviation
percentage points No. of members percentages No. of members
0.10 34 10 122
0.15 25 15 118
0.20 21 20 114
0.25 17 25 108
0.30 11 30 107
0.50 7 50 98
0.90 2 90 7727
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two over-represented countries (i.e. Saudi 
Arabia and Russia) are situated above this 
threshold.
3.1.1 EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
The perception that emerging market 
economies24 are heavily under-represented is 
one of the core issues in the current debate on 
quota reform. Years of above-average growth, 
rising openness and global economic integration, 
increasing international financial integration 
and massively increasing foreign exchange 
reserves have turned the key emerging market 
economies into global players. They have 
contributed two-thirds to global GDP growth 
measured in PPP terms in recent years, represent 
about 60% of the world’s population and hold 
more than two-thirds of the world’s foreign 
exchange reserves. Emerging economies are 
not only an integral part of the world economic 
system but are shaping the state of the global 
economy. Through the outsourcing and 
offshoring of production from advanced 
economies, they contribute to lower 
manufacturing output prices and influence 
global bond markets through large-scale 
purchases of securities. Moreover, the 
phenomenon of global imbalances would be 
difficult to conceptualise without the surpluses 
of emerging Asia and oil producers. In market 
exchange rates, seven of the world’s 20 largest 
economies are emerging market economies (11 
in PPP terms), and this figure is rising, as others 
are moving up the ranks. All these considerations 
suggest that these countries should play an 
important role in the IMF.
Nevertheless, it is far from true that all emerging 
market economies are under-represented in the 
current five-formula system. There are actually 
many which are over-represented, and 
significantly so, even in Asia. India and 
Indonesia are both over-represented; India has 
a relatively large absolute gap of 0.6 percentage 
point or SDR 1.4 billion. In Latin America, 
Venezuela and Argentina have quotas well 
above their calculated weight and even Brazil 
must be considered over-represented under the 
current quota formulae. The two largest cases 
of over-representation (Saudi Arabia and 
Russia) could together free up, if fully adjusted, 
3.2% of the Fund’s total quota, enough to 
double the share of its 92 smallest members.
However, many emerging economies are still 
under-represented, despite far-above-average 
growth rates. The reason for this differs among 
the various countries in the group. In some 
cases, actual quota shares were set well above 
the calculated quota shares for reasons that 
could be considered political. When Russia 
joined the IMF in 1992, it was seen as a 
considerable economic and political power. It 
received its own seat on the IMF Executive 
Board  and its actual quota share was set at 
around 100% above its calculated quota share. 
Even today, despite strong economic growth, 
its actual quota share exceeds the calculated 
share by as much as 60%. A similar case is 
Saudi Arabia, which joined in the 1970s when 
the Fund was in need of financing. It too 
received a separate seat on the Executive 
Board25 and its actual quota share today is still 
three times its calculated quota share. In the 
case of Argentina and Indonesia, there may 
have been political reasons for the countries’ 
quotas at the time, but there are also economic 
reasons. The fact that these economies went 
through a sharp recession and exchange rate 
depreciation from which income levels and the 
exchange rate have not yet recovered (to a much 
more significant extent than other Asian crisis-
hit economies) also helps explain their low 
calculated quota shares, which are based on 
variables measured in international currencies 
(i.e. in SDRs). Moreover, the relatively high 
endowment with foreign exchange reserves 
which some of these countries have accumulated 
24  There is no single definition of an emerging market economy. 
In the context of the quota discussion, emerging market 
economies are mostly taken to mean countries that are not 
among the traditional advanced countries but are relevant for 
the world financial system and the global economy. We take a 
pragmatic stance and include the following 18 countries in the 
group of “main emerging market economies”: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam.
25  The single chairs for Russia, Saudi Arabia and China were not 
foreseen in the Articles of Agreement.
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does not boost the countries’ calculated quota 
shares significantly, as the weight of reserves in 
the current IMF formulae is only about 5%.
Chart 5 highlights 18 main emerging market 
economies in the ranking of all IMF members 
according to their current relative position of 
under or over-representation. It shows that 
there are as many over-represented emerging 
economies as there are under-represented ones 
and that over-representation in relative terms 
is more important than under-representation. 
Some Asian economies are currently under-
represented, such as China, Korea, Malaysia 
and Singapore, but some are over-represented, 
such as India and Indonesia. In Latin America, 
only Mexico is under-represented, while Brazil, 
Chile and Columbia are over-represented. In 
the EU neighbouring regions, Turkey is under-
represented, but Russia is over-represented. 
Hence, there is no clear-cut case of emerging 
market under-representation, whether globally 
or regionally.
Chart 6 re-ranks the countries according to the 
absolute differences in quotas expressed in 
Chart 5 Relative under or over-
representation of the main EMEs
(in percentages)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: The chart plots relative under or over-representation, 
formally expressed as actual quota share minus calculated 
quota share divided by the calculated quota share. Points above 
the horizontal axis show over-represented countries; points 
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Chart 6 Absolute under or over-
representation of main EMEs in SDR terms
(SDR millions)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: The chart plots absolute under or over-representation of 
all IMF members transposed into SDR terms. Points above the 
horizontal axis show over-represented countries; points below 
show under-represented countries.
Ranking of all IMF members








































Table 9 Under or over-representation of the 
main EMEs in SDR millions
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: A negative sign denotes under-representation; a positive 
sign denotes over-representation. The table can be read as 
follows. For example, Malaysia’s quota share is about 50% 
lower than it should be, and the country contributed SDR 
millions 1503 less than it would have if its actual quota share 
were at the appropriate level. The absolute gap between the 








Singapore -79.5 -3,334 -1.53
Malaysia -50.3 -1,503 -0.69
Korea -46.4 -2,538 -1.17
Thailand -45.4 -897 -0.41
China -39.4 -5,260 -2.42
Vietnam -35.9 -183 -0.08
Turkey -27.0 -442 -0.20
Mexico -21.3 -852 -0.39
Philippines -14.6 -150 -0.07
Chile 20.7 146 0.07
Indonesia 29.7 475 0.22
Brazil 30.6 710 0.33
India 48.5 1,358 0.62
Russia 60.6 2,243 1.03
Colombia 62.5 297 0.14
South Africa 87.2 870 0.40
Argentina 164.4 1,316 0.60
Saudi Arabia 211.7 4,745 2.1829
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SDR millions. It does not change the above 
picture significantly. The number of cases on 
both sides stays the same, and countries shift 
according to the absolute value of their 
representation gap. On this scale, China, 
Singapore and Korea are the most significantly 
under-represented members; while Saudi Arabia 
and Russia are the most over-represented (see 
also Table 9).
3.1.2   EU COUNTRIES 
EU countries are often perceived as over-
represented in the Fund and hence as the first 
candidates to give up quota share. This 
perception might be linked to the fact that these 
countries had strong economic positions in the 
1950s through to the 1970s, during which time 
they “built up” their quotas. They are often seen 
as not having given up sufficient quota share in 
favour of fast-growing emerging economies, 
partly because quota reviews have only led to 
gradual adjustments of actual quotas. A typical 
question that epitomises the debate is whether 
it is appropriate that Belgium maintains a higher 
quota in the Fund than India.26 The fact of the 
matter is that India, not Belgium, is over-
represented in the Fund on the basis of the 
current framework, i.e. when the current five 
formulae are applied. Moreover, almost all of 
the EU countries are either broadly in line with 
their calculated weights or even below them 
and would thus qualify as under-represented 
(see Chart 7, Chart 8 and Table 10). The reasons 
for the under-representation of many European 
countries are strong growth (e.g. Ireland), a 
very high degree of openness combined with 
strong trade growth (virtually all countries) and 
stable and strong currencies relative to other 
parts of the world. 
Chart 7 Relative under or over-
representation of EU countries1)
(in percentages)
Note: Points above the horizontal axis show over-represented 
countries; points below show under-represented countries. 
1)  The abbreviations used in the chart are as follows: Belgium 
– BE, Bulgaria – BG, Czech Republic – CZ, Denmark – DK, 
Germany – DE, Estonia – EE, Ireland – IE, Greece – GR, Spain 
– ES, France – FR, Italy – IT, Cyprus – CY, Latvia – LV, 
Lithuania – LT, Luxembourg – LU, Hungary – HU, Malta – MT, 
Netherlands – NL, Austria – AT, Poland – PL, Portugal – PT, 
Romania – RO, Slovenia – SI, Slovakia – SK, Finland – FI, 
Sweden – SE, United Kingdom – UK. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Chart 8 Absolute under or over-
representation of EU countries in SDR terms
(SDR millions)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: The chart plots absolute under or over-representation of 
all IMF members transposed into SDR terms. Points above the 
horizontal axis show over-represented countries; points below 
show under-represented countries.
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26  In terms of total GDP at market prices, India’s GDP is more 
than twice as large as that of Belgium. India’s quota share in 
the Fund is 1.91%; Belgium’s 2.12%. However, while 
Belgium’s quota is broadly in line with its calculated quota 
share, India’s is almost 50% above. The reason for this is that 
openness, i.e. international trade flows, plays an important role 
in the formula, and Belgium is a highly open economy, much 
more open than India.
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3.1.3 OTHER ADVANCED ECONOMIES
The current picture for the ten other advanced 
economies outside the EU is more varied. Half 
are under-represented – Japan even significantly 
so (see Chart 9 and Table 11). Hence, the notion 
that advanced economies are generally over-
represented does not stand up to the facts, at 
least not on the basis of the current formulae. 
Three countries, namely Australia, Iceland and 
New Zealand, are over-represented in double 
digits in relative terms. Interestingly, the IMF’s 
largest member, the United States, is also 
slightly over-represented in relative terms, with 
its actual quota share of 17.1% being above its 
calculated share of 16.3%. Even though the gap 
amounts to less than 5% for the United States, 
the absolute difference is quite significant – 0.8 









Luxembourg -90.7 -2,700 -1.24
Ireland -76.8 -2,772 -1.27
Estonia -58.2 -91 -0.04
Spain -37.4 -1,818 -0.84
Czech 
Republic -35.6 -454 -0.21
Lithuania -34.8 -76 -0.04
Slovakia -33.6 -180 -0.08
Slovenia -27.6 -90 -0.04
Denmark -27.4 -620 -0.28
Austria -23.7 -583 -0.27
Greece -22.0 -231 -0.11
Poland -19.2 -326 -0.15
Netherlands -18.1 -1,141 -0.52
Portugal -17.0 -178 -0.08
Germany -12.7 -1,894 -0.87
Malta -10.6 -12 -0.01
Belgium -6.8 -334 -0.15
Sweden -6.1 -154 -0.07
United 
Kingdom -5.8 -661 -0.30
Hungary -2.5 -25 -0.01
Italy -2.2 -161 -0.07
Latvia 0.1 1 0.00
Cyprus 1.0 2 0.00
Finland 9.8 113 0.05
France 19.6 1,757 0.81
Romania 91.3 491 0.23
Bulgaria 135.1 368 0.17
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: A negative sign denotes under-representation; a positive 
sign denotes over-representation. The table can be read as 
follows. For example, Luxembourg’s quota share is about 90% 
lower than it should be, and the country contributed SDR 
millions 2,700 less than it would have if its actual quota share 
were at the appropriate level. The absolute gap between the 
actual and calculated quota shares is 1.24 percentage point.
Chart 9 Absolute under or over-




Note: The chart plots absolute under or over-representation of 
all IMF members transposed into SDR terms. Points above the 
horizontal axis show over-represented countries; points below 
show under-represented countries.
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San Marino -59.7 -26 -0.01
Israel -21.5 -255 -0.12
Japan -12.7 -1,941 -0.89
Norway -10.7 -199 -0.09
Canada -4.5 -299 -0.14
United States 4.9 1,722 0.79
Switzerland 7.1 228 0.11
Australia 23.5 615 0.28
Iceland 37.4 32 0.01
New Zealand 72.2 375 0.17
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Notes: A negative sign denotes under-representation; a positive 
sign denotes over-representation. The table can be read as 
follows. For example, Israel’s quota share is about 22% lower 
than it should be, and the country contributed SDR millions 255 
less than it would have if its actual quota share were at the 
appropriate level. The absolute gap between the actual and 
calculated quota shares is 0.12 percentage point.31
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Chart 11 Absolute under or over-




Note: The chart shows developing countries whose population 
exceeds 20 million.
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Chart 10 Relative under or over-
representation of developing economies
(in percentages)
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Yemen 1.8 4 0.00
Iran 58.0 550 0.25
Morocco 64.0 230 0.11
Nepal 66.8 28 0.01
Algeria 69.9 516 0.24
Egypt 71.8 394 0.18
Afghanistan 81.8 73 0.03
Peru 96.3 314 0.14
Iraq 96.5 584 0.27
Ukraine 109.4 717 0.33
Nigeria 124.5 972 0.45
Pakistan 142.5 608 0.28
Bangladesh 146.8 317 0.15
Ethiopia 149.8 81 0.04
Tanzania 167.1 125 0.06
Venezuela 186.2 1,730 0.80
Uzbekistan 194.8 182 0.08
Sudan 213.0 214 0.10
Uganda 234.2 126 0.06
Kenya 237.1 191 0.09
Myanmar 280.8 190 0.09
Ghana 309.1 279 0.13
Congo, Dem. Rep.  982.0 484 0.22
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Notes: The table shows developing countries whose 
population exceeds 20 million. The positive sign denotes 
over-representation.
percentage points of the IMF quota or SDR 1.7 
billion. 
What explains the situation of the countries in 
this group? The reasons differ greatly among 
the economies. Some of them have experienced 
solid growth rates; many (although by no means 
all) have had stable exchange rates and seen 
rising openness through trade integration. 
Finally they have been subject to considerable 
variability in external receipts, which also 
enters the formulae. 
3.1.4 DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Developing economies constitute the bulk of 
the over-represented countries in the Fund. A 
look at the larger developing economies in 
terms of population confirms this general 
picture. When the existing framework is 
applied, all developing countries with a 
population above 20 million are over-
represented; and some of them considerably so 
(see Chart 10, Chart 11, and Table 12). The 
reason in the case of most of these countries is 
the fact that their growth performance over the 
past decades has been less favourable than that 
of other economies. Moreover, their currencies 
have often weakened, so that when national 
GDP figures are converted into SDR, their 
economic weight is even lower. 
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3.2  HOW QUOTAS ARE CURRENTLY CALCULATED
As previously explained, when countries have 
joined the Fund, the result of the quota formulae 
has been taken only as a reference point that 
feeds into the analysis for determining the 
country’s quota. Probably the more relevant 
factor is ultimately the judgement of the 
Executive Board as to how the country in 
question compares with other members of the 
Fund. However, one cannot conclude that the 
quota formulae are irrelevant for the distribution 
of financial contributions and voting rights in 
the Fund. Calculated quota shares have always 
played an important role in the choice of 
countries that qualified for the selective parts 
of general quota increases or for ad hoc 
increases. 
3.2.1 THE CURRENT FIVE-FORMULA SYSTEM 
The current system of calculating quotas in the 
Fund is very complex. Not only is it based on 
five formulae, but different formulae are applied 
to different members depending on the result 
they give. The formulae contain the following 
variables: GDP; current receipts and current 
payments (i.e. export and import values), which 
together are considered to signify openness; 
variability of current receipts (i.e. fluctuations 
in exports); and official reserves. Initially in 
1944 there was only a single formula, the 
“Bretton Woods” formula. As Boughton (2001) 
points out, “the equation was calibrated so as to 
yield an aggregate quota of the size agreed upon 
during preliminary negotiations among the 
major countries.” The equation was “not derived 
from theory or econometrics and was neither 
discussed nor even officially disclosed during 
the conference” (p. 860). The economist at the 
US Treasury who actually constructed the 
formula, Raymond Mikesell, confirmed this 
“reverse engineering” approach in his memoirs. 
He said that US Treasury Assistant Secretary 
Harry Dexter White essentially gave him the 
variables but no weights, instructing him to 
derive a formula which “was to give the United 
States a quota of approximately $2.9 billion, 
the United Kingdom (including its colonies) 
about half the US quota, the Soviet Union an 
amount just under that of the United Kingdom, 
and China somewhat less” (Mikesell, 1994, 
p. 22). 
In the early 1960s the Bretton Woods formula 
was complemented by four other formulae, 
leading to the multi-formula approach still used 
today (see also Table 14). This reform was 
intended to slightly increase the calculated 
quota shares of small open economies, as they 
were favoured by the new formulae; the Bretton 
Woods formula continued to be favourable to 
large members. The last revision of the formulae 
took place in the context of the eighth general 
review in 1982/83. 
The application of the formulae follows a 
complex procedure: first, five quotas (Q1 to 
Q5) are calculated on the basis of the five 
formulae. Then the lowest two quotas of Q2, 
Q3, Q4 and Q5 are averaged and the result 
compared with Q1. The higher of the two is 
taken as the member’s calculated quota; this 
figure as percentage of the total calculated 
quota is the country’s calculated quota share. 
This implies that either Q1 is used to calculate 
quotas or the average of a pair out of the other 
formulae is taken. Given that the four other 
formulae can be combined into six pairs, there 
are a total of seven permutations in the 
calculation process.
Table 13 Relevance of the different formulae 
for the derivation of countries’ calculated 
quota shares
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Notes: Only Q1 can be used alone, which it was in 78 cases. Q2, 
Q3, Q4 and Q5 can, by construction, only form half of the 
calculation, e.g. Q2 was used 75 times, but always in combination 
with Q3, Q4, or Q5. As a result of changes in the underlying 
data, the number of members which use a specific formula can 
change from year to year.
Formula Number of members which 
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Table 14 The current five formulae employed to determine calculated quota shares
Formula Alias
Q1 = (0.01Y + 0.025R + 0.05P + 0.2276VC)*(1 + C/Y)
Q2 = (0.0065Y + 0.0205125R + 0.078P + 0.4052VC)*(1 + C/Y)
Q3 = (0.0045Y + 0.03896768R + 0.07P + 0.76976VC)*(1 + C/Y)
Q4 = 0.005Y + 0.042280464R + 0.044 (P + C) + 0.8352VC







Y  = GDP at current market prices for a recent year;
R  = 12-month average of gold, foreign exchange reserves, SDR holdings and reserve positions in the IMF, for a recent year;
P  = annual average of current payments (goods, services, income and private transfers) for a recent five-year period;
C  =   annual average of current receipts (goods, services, income and private transfers) for a recent five-year period (note that 
P+C=openness); and
VC =   variability of current receipts, defined as one standard deviation from the centred five-year moving average, for a recent 
13-year period.
The results of each of the four non-Bretton Woods formulae are multiplied by an adjustment factor, to ensure that the sum of the 
calculations across members equals that derived from the Bretton Woods formula. The calculated quota of a member is the higher of 
the Bretton Woods calculation and the average of the lowest two of the remaining four calculations. 
Source: IMF.
In practice, all formulae are used, but to a 
widely differing extent (see Table 13). The 
original Bretton Woods formula remains 
relevant for about one-third of members. The 
other formulae in different combinations have 
led to the calculated quotas and corresponding 
shares of the other 118 member countries.
It is interesting to note that there is no need to 
employ five formulae. With very little loss of 
precision, these five formulae can be condensed 
into a single formula. Regressing (with no 
constant) the calculated quota onto the four current 
variables, GDP (Y), openness27 (O), variability of 
current export receipts (VC) and reserves (R), 
yields a goodness of fit of R² = 0.998. The 
coefficients with the respective t-statistics of the 
variables in brackets are shown in the equation 
below. Hence, the difference between the five 
formulae and the condensed formula is, on average, 
very small. It would make little difference to use 
a single formula, which would make the 
calculations much less complex and the process of 
quota determination much more transparent.
3.2.2 THE WEIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES 
The Singapore resolution suggests that a 
“significantly higher” weight should be 
attributed to GDP compared with the present 
situation. This raises the question of the weight 
of GDP in the current formulae. The problem is 
that in the current framework variable weights 
can only be approximated, for several reasons: 
first, as explained above, varying combinations 
of formulae apply to different members; second, 
the first three formulae are, due to a 
multiplicative element, non-linear; third, as the 
variables are highly correlated and not 
independent of each other, multicollinearity is 
present. All in all one has to be cautious with 
the interpretation of the estimates.
One way of approximating contributions of a 
variable in the current five-formula system is to 
regress the calculated quota on the variables Y, 
27 In line with usual practice in the current quota debate, the 
variable O (openness) equals the sum of the traditional variables 
P and C, i.e. current payments and current receipts, and measures 
a country’s external trade.
Q  =  0.0058769  Y + 0.040339  O + 0.794659  VC + 0.0176256156  R
 [22.85]  [44.70]  [14.97]  [11.60]
Source: Authors’ estimation.
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O, VC and R. Multiplying the coefficient of a 
variable by its standard deviation yields a 
measure of the importance of a variable (see 
column 4 in Table 15). After normalising these 
data to 100, one can gauge the relative 
importance of a variable, as a rough 
approximation of its “weight”. This method 
assigns weights of 22% to GDP, 53% to 
openness, 20% to variability of export receipts 
and 5% to official reserves.
The following equation is carried out to test the 
coefficients against a country having the 
average in each variable:
0.0059 Y
–







 + 0.0176 R
–
 = 6,152
The coefficients are multiplied by the average 
for the respective variable. The sum of the 
results is SDR m 6,152. This is a close fit to the 
true average calculated quota of SDR m 6,160. 
3.3  FROM QUOTA TO VOTES AND THE ISSUE OF 
BASIC VOTES
As explained before, voting at the Fund is – in 
principle – a combination of a concept of 
“voting according to economic size” and an 
egalitarian concept of “one country one vote”, 
with the votes under the first pillar derived by 
dividing the economic quota by SDR 100,000 
and those under the second pillar being the 
basic votes. To illustrate: for Argentina, a quota 
of SDR 2,117.1 million yields 21,171 votes. 
Adding 250 basic votes gives a total of 21,421 
votes.28
The weights of the two pillars have, however, 
shifted over time. Originally, the egalitarian 
concept of basic votes was quite important, 
with basic votes accounting for 11.3% of total 
votes. The share even peaked at 15.6% in 1958 
because new members joined without the Fund 
receiving an overall quota increase.29 From then 
on the share of total basic votes in total votes 
decreased continuously, as the Fund’s overall 
quota augmented but the number of basic votes 
remained fixed (see Table 16). If the share of 
basic votes in total votes were to reach its initial 
level of 11.3% today, an increase to 1,506 basic 
votes would be needed, and the peak in the 
relative importance of basic votes would only 
be reached at 2,185 basic votes per member.
Table 17 shows the votes deriving from quota 
and basic votes for selected IMF members. It 
illustrates that the importance of basic votes 
ranges from negligible for the largest member 
to predominant for the smallest. The table also 
shows that basic votes are significant, 
accounting for more than 10% of total votes for 
close to 100 countries.
Even though basic votes play a limited overall 
role in the institution, making up only 2% of 
total votes, they affect the distribution of voting 









coefficient times standard 
deviation as a share
Y 0.0059 22.85 704,142 4,138 22
O 0.0403 44.70 252,844 10,199 53
VC 0.7947 14.97 4,714 3,746 20
R 0.0176 11.60 57,045 1,005 5
Sum     19,089 100
Source: Authors’ estimation.
28 This paper deals only with voting shares, which reflect the 
distribution of votes in the institution. It does not deal with 
voting power, which measures the effective influence members 
have in specific decision-making processes, for example by 
creating coalitions or blocking certain decisions. For such an 
analysis in an IMF context see Bini Smaghi (2006) or Leech and 
Leech (2006). 
29 To be precise, the share of total basic votes in total votes 
increases only when new members have below-average voting 
shares; in the opposite case it decreases. 35
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Table 16 Share of basic votes in total votes at the IMF, 1944 to the present
Source: IMF, Quota Distribution – Selected Issues, 17 July 2003.
Note: Montenegro is not included in this compilation.
Year Number of 
IMF members
Total votes Number of 
basic votes
Share of basic votes 
in total votes 
(in percentages)
1944 45 99,390 11,250 11.3
1958 68 108,930 17,000 15.6
1965 101 179,928 25,250 14.0
1970 115 236,835 28,750 12.1
1976 132 319,714 33,000 10.3
1978 140 432,415 35,000 8.1
1983 145 646,415 36,250 5.6
1990 152 1,387,910 38,000 2.7
1998 183 2,166,040 45,750 2.1
2005 184 2,173,313 46,000 2.1
Table 17 Votes of selected IMF members and the importance of basic votes
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Ranking according 
to voting share Country
Quota-based votes Basic votes Total votes
Share of basic 
votes in total
1 2 3 = 1+2 2/3; in percentages 
1 United States 371,493 250 371,743 0.07
30 Malaysia 14,866 250 15,116 1.65
60 Zambia 4,891 250 5,141 4.86
90 Lebanon 2,030 250 2,280 10.96
120 Guinea 1,071 250 1,321 18.93
150 Chad 560 250 810 30.86
185 Palau 31 250 281 88.97
shares. Since they raise the votes of smaller 
members over-proportionally, they raise their 
voting share, while diminishing the voting 
share of larger members. The point below which 
countries benefit from basic votes is currently 
0.54% of the total IMF quota. Given that there 
are many small members and fewer large 
members, basic votes can improve the situation 
for the majority of the membership. At present, 
148 members have a larger share owing to basic 
votes, while 37 countries see their share slightly 
decline.30 Hence basic votes are important for a 
large number of small and very small economies 
in the Fund.
3.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed in detail the status 
quo of under and over-representation of 
individual members and country groups at the 
IMF, comparing countries’ actual quota shares 
with the calculated quota shares that result from 
applying the existing five formulae to the most 
recent economic data. It has shown that under 
and over-representation is widespread and cuts 
through all groups of countries; it is not 
concentrated on emerging economies. It has 
also shown that many countries are actually 
over-represented, especially developing 
economies, whose economic growth has been 
in a lower range than that of many other parts 
of the global economy in recent years.
30  Before the ad hoc increase for China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey 
agreed in Singapore in 2006 only 36 countries were negatively 
affected by the basic votes; Turkey switched sides after its ad 
hoc increase.
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Some of the under and over-representation 
results may be counter-intuitive, especially the 
fact that many advanced economies, including 
in Europe, are under-represented and many 
emerging economies and developing countries 
are over-represented. Two important 
explanations for this are that some emerging 
economies’ currencies have been weakened 
compared by periods of crisis and did not fully 
recover since, implying a lower weight when 
converted into international currencies, and 
some of their quotas were set deliberately above 
the calculated level initially. Moreover, a 
number of European economies have 
experienced strong growth in recent years, 
coupled with a stable or appreciating exchange 
rate. Table 18 summaries under and over-
representation (column 4) and the redistribution 
of voting shares due to basic votes (column 5) 
for selected countries. 
The chapter has also explored the current 
framework for setting quotas at the IMF, 
including the five-formula approach, 
underpinning the case for simplification. The 
various avenues towards a different way to set 
quotas will be explored in the next chapter. 37
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Euro area 22.89 27.50 22.56 -4.6 -
Germany 5.98 6.85 5.87 -0.9 -
France 4.94 4.13 4.84 0.8 -
Italy 3.24 3.32 3.19 -0.1 -
Netherlands 2.37 2.90 2.33 -0.5 -
Belgium 2.12 2.27 2.08 -0.2 -
Spain 1.40 2.24 1.38 -0.8 -
Austria 0.86 1.13 0.85 -0.3 -
Finland 0.58 0.53 0.58 0.1 -
Portugal 0.40 0.48 0.40 -0.1 +
Ireland 0.39 1.66 0.39 -1.3 +
Greece 0.38 0.48 0.38 -0.1 +
Luxembourg 0.13 1.37 0.14 -1.2 +
Slovenia 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.0 +
Total EU 32.36 37.77 31.99 -5.4 -
United Kingdom 4.94 5.24 4.84 -0.3 -
Sweden 1.10 1.17 1.09 -0.1 -
Denmark 0.76 1.04 0.75 -0.3 -
Poland 0.63 0.78 0.63 -0.1 -
Hungary 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.0 +
Romania 0.47 0.25 0.47 0.2 +
Czech Republic 0.38 0.59 0.38 -0.2 +
Bulgaria 0.29 0.13 0.30 0.2 +
Slovakia 0.16 0.25 0.17 -0.1 +
Lithuania 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.0 +
Cyprus 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.0 +
Latvia 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.0 +
Malta 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.0 +
Estonia 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.0 +
G7 45.22 45.90 44.35 -0.7 -
United States 17.08 16.28 16.73 0.8 -
Japan 6.12 7.01 6.00 -0.9 -
Canada 2.93 3.06 2.88 -0.1 -
18 main EMEs 21.98 23.36 21.73 -1.4 -
China 3.72 6.14 3.65 -2.4 -
India 1.91 1.29 1.88 0.6 -
Indonesia 0.96 0.74 0.95 0.2 -
Korea 1.35 2.51 1.33 -1.2 -
Malaysia 0.68 1.37 0.68 -0.7 -
Thailand 0.50 0.91 0.50 -0.4 +
Philippines 0.40 0.47 0.41 -0.1 +
Singapore 0.40 1.93 0.40 -1.5 +
Vietnam 0.15 0.24 0.16 -0.1 +
Brazil 1.40 1.07 1.38 0.3 -
Mexico 1.45 1.84 1.43 -0.4 -
Argentina 0.97 0.37 0.96 0.6 -
Chile 0.39 0.33 0.40 0.1 +
Colombia 0.36 0.22 0.36 0.1 +
Saudi Arabia 3.21 1.03 3.16 2.2 -
Russia 2.73 1.70 2.69 1.0 -
Turkey 0.55 0.75 0.55 -0.2 -
South Africa 0.86 0.46 0.85 0.4 -
Rest of the world 19.54 12.51 20.67 7.0 +
ROW: Developing 14.79 8.12 15.94 6.7 +
African Constit.-19 2.85 1.32 3.00 1.5 +
African Constit.-24 1.34 0.40 1.59 0.9 +
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4  AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN PARAMETERS 
OF REFORM
“When the facts change, I change my mind. 
What do you do, Sir?” is a well-known quip of 
John Maynard Keynes. Applied to the discussion 
on misperceptions of under and over-
representation discussed in the preceding 
chapter, it could suggest that once confronted 
with the facts regarding actual under and over-
representation, the voices of those accusing the 
IMF of under and over-representation of its 
membership would fade. But the opposite 
happened. The views persisted, although they 
were not supported by the “facts” of the 
calculated quota share. In fact, the critics went 
a step further and called for new ingredients for 
a quota formula, which is the issue now on the 
table.
A new quota formula is highly welcome, even 
from a technical viewpoint, because the varying 
application of five different formulae is highly 
opaque and does not support the IMF’s calls for 
good governance in its member countries.
Therefore it has become widely accepted that a 
new formula would mean a single formula 
uniformly applied to all members, and that it 
should be simple and transparent. But this is 
probably as far as the consensus reaches, and 
the debate – as at summer 2007 – is fully open, 
both on the variables to be included and the 
weights to be assigned to them. Experts ponder 
over the mathematical shape of the ideal 
formula, in particular whether it should be 
additive or multiplicative to have certain 
desirable properties, and whether variables 
should be expressed in absolute levels as in the 
past or in shares in the world aggregate. Finally, 
officials are searching for ways to combine 
purely economic variables, which by definition 
favour the large and rich economies, with a 
sense of greater participation and ownership for 
the smaller and less rich economies. The use of 
compression, PPP, a larger number of basic 
votes and even population size are options 
considered.
Technical as these issues may sound, each of 
them matters greatly as far as the ultimate 
distribution of quotas, and thus representation 
and eventually the governance of the institution 
are concerned. Therefore it is no surprise that 
one has to enter into the “technicalities” in 
order to find economically and politically 
viable solutions, both for today and into the 
future.
Since the allocation of shares in the Fund is a 
zero-sum game where certain countries can 
only gain if others lose, the international 
financial community is faced with a classic 
distribution problem. We know from experience 
as well as economic theory that distribution 
issues should ideally be decided under the “veil 
of ignorance” (John Rawls, 1999), where 
decision-makers agree on the rules of the game 
without knowing the outcome for themselves. 
Otherwise their view on the rules will always 
be biased by knowledge of the outcome of 
individual decisions. Applied to the debate on 
Fund quotas, this would mean that countries 
should agree on the method – i.e. variables and 
weights in a new formula – without knowledge 
of the outcome. Of course, such a principles-
based approach is as ideal as it is unrealistic. In 
reality, officials and country representatives 
will comment on the method once they have 
seen the results for their country. Taking the 
issue a step further, some may even start from 
desirable results for their country and then 
design the method that supports this result, 
inspired by the “reverse engineering” approach 
that was applied at the time of the establishment 
of the Fund.
In practice therefore, the new formula needs to 
meet both ends: it needs to be compliant with 
certain principles that in themselves are 
reasonable, and it needs to produce results 
which are acceptable to the individual members 
and comply with a notion of fair and effective 
representation of the membership as a whole.
Further to the preview given in Chapter 2, this 
chapter explores the various ingredients in this 
debate in more depth. It starts by analysing 39
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existing variables together with points raised 
against them, reviews possible further variables 
and analyses various technical aspects. 
Throughout the discussion, it tries to closely 
link these aspects with political reality, by 
assessing the impact of various changes on the 
overall representation in the Fund.
4.1 EXISTING  VARIABLES 
A natural starting point for the discussion of a 
new quota formula is the role of quotas 
themselves. As explained in Chapter 2, quotas 
play a critical role in the financial structure 
(financial contributions), financing operations 
(credit access) and governance (voting shares) 
of the Fund. These multiple roles for quotas 
inevitably have to provide guidance for the 
choice of variables that should enter the 
formula. However, given the diversity of the 
roles, the quota formula will have to fulfil 
competing objectives:
–  To reflect the fact that quotas determine a 
country’s financial contributions, variables 
that enter the formula should reflect 
countries’ ability to contribute to the funding 
of the IMF.
–  Since access limits are set in terms of quotas, 
it has often been argued that the variables 
should reflect the potential size of countries’ 
borrowing needs. In practice this argument 
may be less relevant today than a decade 
ago, given the considerable increase in 
emerging economies’ reserves and the 
decline in external debt, but it still figures 
regularly in quota discussions.
–  Quotas determine the capacity to influence 
IMF decisions. Since decisions often deal 
with the use of Fund resources, this role 
would suggest once again linking variables 
to the ability to contribute. In a broader 
sense, however, decisions also concern IMF 
responsibilities in the global economy, 
including its surveillance activities and 
technical assistance. Hence one can argue 
that the variables should reflect countries’ 
weight and role in the world economy, i.e. 
their integration in the world economy and 
the international financial system and the 
responsibility they bear for the functioning 
of the system. This would also imply that 
the quota formula should set appropriate 
incentives for member countries to pursue 
policies consistent with IMF principles and 
objectives, which, on the basis of the Fund’s 
Articles of Agreement, can be summarised 
as a contribution to global integration, a 
stable global financial system and worldwide 
growth and development.31
There are currently five variables included in 
the formulae: GDP; current payments and 
current receipts (both taken together are referred 
to as “openness”); variability of export receipts; 
and reserves. Loosely linking these variables to 
the above considerations, both GDP and 
openness would be related to all three aspects, 
namely the ability to contribute, the borrowing 
needs and the weight and stake in the world 
economy; variability would be related to 
borrowing needs, and foreign exchange reserves 
to the funding ability of members. At first 
glance, therefore, one could conclude that all 
relevant considerations are reflected in the 
current system. However, as usual, the devil is 
in the detail: depending on the perspective 
taken when looking more closely into the 
variables, problematic aspects can be detected 
that cast doubt on either the definition used or, 
more fundamentally, the reasoning for including 
a certain variable into the formula. These 
considerations will be discussed in turn.
4.1.1 GDP 
GDP is widely recognised as an essential 
variable in a new quota formula because it is 
the most comprehensive measure of the 
economic size of a country. It is also well 
reported and available in a timely fashion for 
virtually the entire membership. In terms of 
31  Some authors argue that given the multiple role of quotas in the 
Fund, they should not be summarised in one single number but 
should be differentiated across purposes. They suggest splitting 
up the various functions that quotas currently perform; see for 
example Bird and Rowlands (2005). This, however, would make 
the overall system of quota determination even more complex. 
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quota functions, GDP can be regarded as a 
relevant indicator of a country’s ability to 
contribute, its potential borrowing needs and 
more broadly its role and weight in the global 
system.
The current definition of GDP in the quota 
formulae refers to a single recent year and 
converts national data at annual average market 
exchange rates into SDR values. While it has 
been agreed to move to three-year averages in 
order to smooth the effect of fluctuations in 
economic performance, the main question mark 
relates to the conversion at market exchange 
rates, which has traditionally been used in quota 
calculations and tends to favour advanced 
economies. The alternative would be to adopt a 
conversion method based on PPP rates, which 
would lead to a significant change in calculated 
quota shares in favour of developing countries 
since the distribution of PPP-based GDP differs 
substantially from the that based on market 
exchange rates, as will be discussed in detail 
below.
4.1.2 OPENNESS
The variable of current import payments and 
export receipts – or openness – is also considered 
as essential by most analysts because it relates 
squarely to one of the IMF’s main purposes 
namely to “facilitate the expansion and balanced 
growth of international trade” (Article I of the 
Articles of Agreement) and is relevant to all of 
the various roles of Fund quotas. It reflects 
more than GDP the stake countries have in the 
global economy: countries that are more open 
and thus more exposed to international trade 
and financial flows will have a greater 
willingness to engage in international 
cooperation than economies that are more 
domestically focused. Openness also has a 
bearing on countries’ ability to contribute. In 
addition, it may be seen as an indicator of 
potential demand for Fund resources, since 
relatively open countries may be more 
vulnerable to external shocks.
In the existing five formulae, openness is 
defined as the sum of current receipts (export 
values, adjusted for re-exports) and the sum of 
current payments (import values) with regard to 
goods, services, income and private transfers 
using a five-year average. Current receipts and 
payments enter separately and combined; in 
three of the five formulae, a ratio of current 
receipts to GDP is used as a multiplicative 
factor. Since the latter element can lead to 
anomalous results if a country’s GDP growth 
exceeds its export growth, a simpler measure of 
openness has been proposed in recent 
discussions, namely the sum of current receipts 
and payments averaged over a five-year 
period.
One of the main questions raised on openness 
concerns the fact that the data enter the quota 
calculations on a gross rather than a value-
added basis, which is regarded as double 
counting of cross-border flows for countries 
with large entrepôt trade activities, financial 
centres, or that process imports for re-export.32
However, the process of globalisation is based 
on an international division of labour, which – 
through outsourcing and offshoring – implies a 
stronger role for processing trade and re-
exporting by definition. In recent years, this has 
involved not only countries such as Singapore 
and the Netherlands (which have large harbours) 
but also China and many countries in eastern 
Europe, with considerable volumes of foreign 
direct investment from global corporations. 
Hence globalisation is spreading processing 
and re-export trade across a much larger number 
of countries.
It has sometimes been argued33 that openness 
does not need to be included since it is highly 
correlated with GDP. While this argument could 
also be used the other way round, i.e. to suggest 
dropping GDP, one has to be aware that several 
32  In recognition of this issue, the Fund has traditionally made 
adjustments to the database for the purpose of quota calculations. 
However, such adjustments inevitably involve judgement and 
depend on data availability. Since Singapore is one of the main 
examples of such countries – its openness share is almost five 
times its GDP share in the world economy – this matter has 
become known as the “Singapore issue”.
33  See, for example, Cooper and Truman (2007). 41
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of the variables discussed are highly correlated. 
Large countries often display high trade 
volumes and large absolute fluctuations in trade 
as well as high reserves, which all enter in 
absolute levels into the current formulae. 
Correlation coefficients between GDP, openness 
and variability are all above 0.9. And only 
recently has the correlation of GDP with reserves 
fallen, currently to about 0.4, as, since 2000, the 
accumulation of reserves has been concentrated 
on a few economies (see Table 19).
However, even if the correlation between some 
variables, e.g. GDP and openness, is very high 
across all members, this does not mean that the 
respective variables are equally important for 
all members. The shares of individual members 
in the global total of a variable, e.g. a country’s 
share in world GDP, differ considerably (see 
Table 20). For example, the United States may 
prefer GDP – since its share in the global total 
is 29% – to openness – in which its share is only 
15%. For the euro area, the opposite is the case. 
This is yet another element that makes agreement 
on a new quota formula difficult, because 
members tend to favour variables which favour 
them.
Another question under debate is whether the 
openness variable should be broadened from 
trade flows to also cover financial flows. This 
issue will be dealt with in the section on new 
variables below.
4.1.3 VARIABILITY
Variability is a traditional variable in the quota 
formulae and is intended to gauge a country’s 
potential vulnerability to balance of payments 
shocks and hence its potential need for Fund 
resources. While some consider that the 
potential need for Fund resources is already 
captured by the openness variable, others argue 
that relatively closed economies can face 
balance of payments crises. In line with the 
latter argument, the Cooper group suggested 
giving a prominent role to variability in a new 
formula along with GDP. 
Variability is currently defined as the standard 
deviation from a centred five-year moving 
average of export values (in SDR terms), for a 
“recent 13-year period”, currently 1992-2004. 
The Executive Board has recently proposed 
to modify the definition in a new formula 
by adding to it the variability of net capital 
inflows.34 The modification is understood as an 
attempt to capture financial vulnerability. 
Paradoxically, however, while this would lift 
the shares of a few emerging market economies, 
the principal beneficiary by far would be the 
United States, whose share in that variable 
would increase considerably, from 13.4% to 
20.7%. Some other industrial countries would 
also profit from the proposed modification, 
since that they have the largest cross-border 
financial flows and also the largest absolute 
swings in these flows.
Regarding its relevance for the future of quota 
calculations, the question has to be addressed 
as to whether the variability variable implies a 
reward for unstable economic policies.





VC 0.97 0.92 1
R 0.42 0.44 0.40 1
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Table 20 Shares of selected IMF members in 
world totals
YO V CR
United States 28.9 15.0 20.7 2.1
Euro area 22.8 32.1 23.7 5.0
Japan 11.0 5.3 6.9 22.3
China 5.2 5.6 3.4 19.4
Source: Authors’ calculation.
34  This measure of net capital flows is the difference between net 
asset and liability flows in the financial account. In addition, 
there have been suggestions to use the deviation from a three-
year average (rather than the five-year average in the existing 
formulae) so as to capture shorter term-trends. 
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4.1.4 RESERVES
Since the Fund’s creation foreign exchange 
reserves have been considered a key indicator 
of a country’s financial strength and thus of its 
ability to contribute to the Fund’s resources.
Reserves are currently defined in the formulae 
as the twelve-months average of a recent year 
and include foreign exchange, SDR holdings, 
reserve position in the Fund, and monetary gold 
valued at SDR 35 per ounce.35
Global economic developments in recent years 
have, however, fundamentally changed the 
perspective on foreign exchange reserves. If 
authorities conduct large-scale interventions 
and build up foreign exchange reserves in order 
to keep exchange rates artificially weak and 
thus contribute to distortions in global trade 
patterns, should this imply a higher quota in the 
Fund? If countries themselves recognise that 
they have “excess” reserves, should these 
excess reserves still be included in the 
calculation? Inclusion of reserves in a quota 
formula would reward such practices and would 
thus hardly be compatible with the objectives 
of the Fund. In addition, reserves have become 
a less relevant indicator of ability to contribute 
for countries with access to international capital 
markets; this is even more the case for the 
international reserve currencies.36
Against this background, there are three main 
options: one would be to eliminate reserves 
from the quota formula, which might meet with 
opposition from countries that would benefit 
from its inclusion. A second option would be to 
give reserves only a very limited weight in the 
formula. A third option would be to cap the 
reserves that enter the formula. Such a cap 
could be set in relation to domestic (e.g. money 
stock, GDP) or external (short-term debt) 
variables.
A cap on reserves would face many challenges. 
Most importantly, the IMF membership would 
need to agree on one benchmark for what could 
be considered a reasonable level of reserves for 
all countries. However, members are too diverse 
to fit under a single measure of optimal reserves, 
partly due to different exchange rate regimes 
they have chosen.
4.2 NEW  VARIABLES  AND  RELATED  ISSUES 
UNDER DISCUSSION
Two variables receive the main attention as 
candidates for a new quota formula, namely 
financial openness and GDP based on conversion 
at PPP rather than market exchange rates. 
Financial openness is considered to reflect the 
increasing importance of financial transactions 
and possible financial risks in the global 
economy. GDP in PPP terms is considered to 
achieve a more “equitable” distribution of 
quotas in the Fund by benefiting lower-income 
economies.
Other variables under discussion are financial 
contributions to the Fund and population. 
Linked to the openness variable is the issue of 
whether intra-currency union flows should be 
excluded.
4.2.1 FINANCIAL OPENNESS
In the first decades of the IMF, trade flows were 
much larger than international financial 
transactions, which were hampered by countries’ 
capital controls. Therefore the inclusion of a 
financial variable in the formula was not an 
issue. However, financial globalisation has 
increased considerably over the past three 
decades and now has an important bearing on 
exchange rate behaviour and the international 
adjustment mechanism (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2005). Financial integration matters 
both for the countries concerned and for the 
IMF; the interaction between international 
financial flows and domestic stability has 
become an increasingly central issue for Fund 
surveillance and lending.
35  Some have suggested valuing gold at market price in line with 
international statistical standards. This would mean a more than 
ten-fold increase in the value of reserves in gold (in June 2007 
gold prices were about SDR 430 or US$ 650 per ounce). 
36  An interesting early analysis of international reserves and the 
IMF quota formula can be found in Hawkings and Rangarajan 
(1970).43
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Against this background, the question arises as 
to whether, for the purpose of calculating quotas, 
the concept of openness should be broadened to 
cover not only the current account but also the 
financial account. One can argue that financial 
openness is relevant to the multiple roles of the 
quota, as its extent has a bearing on the potential 
need of a country for Fund resources, its 
contribution to the Fund and its stake in the 
global economy. Furthermore, as the likely new 
definition of variability will also include a 
financial component, a parallel modification of 
the openness variable could also be justified.
As the importance of global capital markets for 
the Fund and its member countries is undisputed, 
what factors would argue against the inclusion 
of a financial openness variable in the quota 
formula? The main difficulties are linked to 
data quality and availability problems. Although 
some improvements have been achieved over 
recent years, the issue still remains problematic. 
The two main concepts used to measure 
financial openness, i.e. flows or stocks, both 
have their merits and drawbacks.
A flow measure could include the absolute sum 
of gross37 inflows and outflows of FDI, portfolio 
investment and “other investment” within a given 
period of time. Compared with a stock measure, 
valuation is less of a problem. But the accuracy 
of financial account data in many countries is not 
sufficiently timely and reliable. Moreover, for 
those countries where data are not available 
through the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS),38 “gap-filling” would be required, 
as for other variables when data is lacking. 
However, such gap-filling is more difficult for 
financial variables that are highly volatile.
A stock-based measure – i.e. the sum of gross 
external assets and liabilities reported as part of 
a country’s International Investment Position 
(IIP) in the IFS – might give a more accurate 
picture of a country’s integration in international 
capital markets.39 Such a measure would show 
the extent of investment in a country by non-
residents and of investments abroad by the 
residents of the same country. However, the 
country coverage is, while improving, still not 
sufficient to allow quota calculations for the 
whole membership. In the period 2000-04, only 
106 countries reported full or partial data on 
their IIP to the IMF, and of those only 85 were 
considered full reporters. Here too, gap filling 
is a problem. In addition, exchange rate 
movements pose a particular problem for the 
valuation of stocks. There is as yet no harmonised 
methodology on this issue, including on the 
treatment of differences between book value 
and market price valuation. In terms of 
compatibility with the other variables, a flow 
measure of financial openness would logically 
fit better with most: GDP, current payments, 
current receipts and variability of current 
receipts are more closely related to financial 
flows. Conversely, the IIP is more closely 
related to national wealth than to GDP.
As an alternative, the income component of the 
current account could be used as a proxy for the 
IIP,40 with the advantage that the data is already 
used today, since investment income is included 
as part of current receipts and payments in the 
existing openness variable.
In addition to data issues, one has to bear in mind 
that financial globalisation – although it has 
increased in most member countries – has moved 
furthest in advanced economies. Emerging markets 
and developing countries have seen more moderate 
increases, with benign worldwide financial 
conditions and abundant liquidity having supported 
the process in recent years. The smallest increases 
have been experienced by low-income countries.41 
37  Net flows are not a useful indicator of a member’s involvement. 
Some authors prefer value-added over gross flow data, but these 
are not readily available.
38  Data on flows would be partially available for 171 countries, of 
which 149 countries reported data for at least one year in the 
period between 2001 and 2005. Net FDI flows are reported more 
widely. 
39  See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005). 
40  The correlation between investment income and the IIP is very 
high, at 0.98 for 81 comprehensive reporters; advanced countries 
account for 82% of the total. 
41 These differences in financial openness across the Fund’s 
membership can be explained by different capital control 
regimes, as well as by a range of persistent factors, including 
different degrees of institutional quality, domestic financial 
development, as well as geographic and historical linkages.
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The share of advanced countries in financial 
account flows in the years 2000-04 amounted to 
88%. The IIP concept tends to favour countries 
with a longer-term track record in international 
capital markets, which have therefore been able to 
build up a larger stock of assets and liabilities. 
Hence a flow-based measure would be preferable 
for emerging markets and developing countries, 
which are in the process of investment 
accumulation. Among the IIP reporting countries, 
advanced economies account for over 90% of the 
global totals, in part reflecting the fact that non-
reporting countries are mainly developing 
countries. Some members with important 
international financial centres (e.g. Ireland, 
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) have a 
particularly high IIP, which does not reflect 
exclusively their domestic economy but also its 
role as a financial intermediary. As regards total 
investment income, advanced economies account 
for about 83%. For this concept too, countries with 
important international financial centres have a 
relatively high share. This situation means that 
advanced economies in particular, plus a few 
emerging markets, would benefit from the 
inclusion of financial openness in the quota 
calculations, while other countries, especially 
low-income countries, would tend to lose.
Chart 12 GDP based on market exchange rates versus PPP: the top ten economies
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4.2.2 GDP IN PPP TERMS VERSUS GDP AT 
MARKET EXCHANGE RATES
As mentioned above, differences of views exist 
about whether, for the purpose of quota 
calculations, national GDP figures should be 
converted into SDR at market exchange rates 
(MER) or using PPP. This issue has a 
considerable impact on the distribution of quota 
shares since the distribution of PPP-based GDP 
differs substantially from that based on market 
exchange rates (see Chart 12).
If PPP-based GDP were the only variable in a 
new quota formula, the calculated quota share 
of advanced countries would fall from 68% 
(resulting from the existing five formulae) to 
52%, while that of emerging and developing 
countries would increase to 48% from 32% 
under the five formulae.
Which is the better measure for a cross-country 
comparison? If there were no frictions in world 
trade (e.g. tariffs or transport costs) prices 
would be the same everywhere after correcting 
for exchange rates, and the MER and PPP 
adjustments would yield the same result. But 
frictions are large, particularly in the service 
sector. In reality, therefore, MER and PPP 
approaches generate substantial differences in 
terms of relative income levels and rankings. 
Both approaches have advantages and 45
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disadvantages, meaning that no universally 
correct approach exists.
PPP-based GDP is often seen as preferable 
when relative welfare levels of countries are to 
be compared. For instance, it is used in the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook as a measure 
of the volume of goods and services produced 
by a country and in cross-country comparisons. 
This approach is intended to provide accurate 
estimates of real incomes in countries with 
widely varying price structures. It is achieved 
by estimating the cost of a given basket of 
goods in a benchmark year in either the prices 
of another country or at some synthetic measure 
of world prices. A PPP approach thus assigns 
a single price to the same good or service 
regardless of where it is produced. This gives a 
higher value to production in the non-tradables 
sector in developing countries than would be 
implied by a market exchange rate conversion 
factor.
But PPP has important drawbacks in terms of 
data quality and availability. PPP-based GDP 
data of sufficient quality to be used for quota 
calculations are only available for a subset of 
the IMF membership. Data problems include 
long lags in the availability of data; gaps in the 
participation in surveys that force heavy 
reliance on estimation and raise questions about 
the validity of the data for these countries 
(primarily small developing countries); and 
lack of a common survey methodology across 
countries, so that the surveys are not necessarily 
fully comparable. In addition, the comparison 
of prices might neglect differences in the quality 
of goods.
The current round of the International 
Comparison Program (ICP) represents a major 
undertaking to upgrade the quality of PPP-
based GDP data. Its objective is to provide a 
consistent database for the 147 countries (not 
all of them Fund members) participating in the 
voluntary program. The completion of this 
project is scheduled for end-2007 and is likely 
to lead to significant changes in PPP-based 
GDP estimates for individual countries. But 
estimates will still be required for 41 Fund 
members not participating.
The main benefit of using market exchange 
rates is that these data are observable and 
available in a timely manner. The main 
disadvantage is linked to the fact that exchanges 
rates can exhibit changes which are unrelated to 
underlying trends in countries’ GDP, because 
currencies are traded also for purposes other 
than trade in goods or services. If the value of 
a country’s currency falls by, say, half against 
the US dollar, the country’s GDP measured in 
dollars will also halve, but this does not 
necessarily imply that the citizens of that 
country produced less in that period or became 
any poorer.
Also, market exchange rates reflect only 
tradable goods. As non-tradables’ price levels 
tend to be relatively low in lower-income 
countries, calculations based on market 
exchange rates will typically understate the 
income levels of poorer countries relative to 
higher-income countries (Balassa-Samuelson 
effect). By the same token, a PPP-based 
comparison of GDP levels that uses price data 
biased towards high-income countries will 
typically overstate GDP levels of low-income 
countries due to the higher cost of non-tradables 
in higher-income countries.
In view of these differences between the two 
concepts, the question arises as to which would 
be better suited to the purpose of quota 
calculations. Approaching this question from 
the perspective of the roles of quotas, one can 
distinguish between the financial operations of 
the Fund and the non-financial activities.
GDP converted at market exchange rates can be 
seen as the more relevant measure of a member’s 
ability to contribute to the Fund’s resources and 
of its weight in the global financial system, as 
this concept reflects the international market 
value of resources generated by an economy. 
Likewise, it is more relevant to a member’s 
potential need to borrow from the Fund: trade 
and capital flows are transacted in market 
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exchange rates, which in turn determine balance 
of payment problems.
Some argue that a case could be made for PPP-
based GDP being more relevant for the Fund’s 
non-financial activities, i.e. surveillance and 
capacity building, since it is used for cross-
country comparison of goods and services 
produced by economies and would thus 
represent a better measure of countries’ weight 
in the global economy (Mirakhor and Zaidi 
2006).
Any decision on the appropriate conversion 
factor will need to balance these considerations. 
Political realities will also necessarily imply 
that countries look at the outcome of the two 
concepts in terms of effect on the distribution 
of quotas among members. In that context, it 
will have to be kept in mind that PPP will not 
necessarily always be beneficial for emerging 
markets; as they graduate from emerging to 
advanced status, market exchange rates will 
become more advantageous for them, too.
As a possible compromise between the different 
considerations, some have argued in favour of 
a blended variable which includes both concepts. 
But here also, a decision has to be taken on the 
weights of the two concepts, which is largely a 
question of judgement.
4.2.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUBSIDISED LENDING
Rather than looking at the ability of countries 
to contribute, one could recognise their 
willingness to do so and consider actual 
financial contributions to subsidised lending 
schemes. In the current discussions, the idea 
was expressed to include contributions to the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
or the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) as 
variables in the formula.
In the past, there have been cases when financial 
contributions have been taken into account in 
determining increases in members’ quotas both 
within and outside general quota reviews.42  
However, financial contributions were never 
formally included in the quota formulae; they 
constituted additional considerations for 
deciding on selective or ad hoc increases.
Should the current reform discussion be used to 
include financial contributions in the new 
formula? Many practical difficulties have to be 
acknowledged. Which types of contribution 
should be considered, since members have 
contributed in a variety of forms, and over what 
period? Is a loan to the PRFG Trust of the same 
quality as a contribution to the subsidy account? 
Moreover, participation in facilities such as the 
NAB is not open to all members, and a certain 
degree of circular causation would be in place 
as the distribution of quotas has in turn a certain 
bearing on contributions to subsidised lending. 
For all these reasons, it would be challenging to 
include such a variable in the quota formula. At 
the same time, the issue itself clearly deserves 
more prominence, to show the link between 
rights and responsibilities in an institution such 
as the Fund.
To illustrate the above considerations, Table 21 
provides an overview of the main contributors 
to the PRGF, which is the IMF’s low-interest 
lending facility for low-income countries. This 
facility, which involves concessional lending to 
currently about 80 low-income countries, is 
financed through Trust funds, to which members 
provide contributions. Japan and European 
economies are the main contributors at present, 
several of them providing a proportion of the 
financing well above their quota shares in the 
Fund. The share of the Fund’s largest member, 
the United States, falls far short of its quota 
share in the institution.
4.2.4 EXCLUDING INTRA-CURRENCY UNION 
FLOWS
Excluding intra-euro area trade from the 
openness variable of the euro area countries is 
often suggested by non-European observers. 
Their main argument is that the euro has formed 
a new currency area and, as for other currency 
42  Examples are the ad hoc quota increases for Italy in 1964 and 
Saudi Arabia in 1981, the selective increases for oil-exporting 
countries in the sixth review, and the ad hoc increase for Japan 
in the ninth review. 47
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areas (generally countries), intra-euro area 
trade should be excluded. This argument puts 
the euro area at the level of a country, which 
obviously stretches the political reality of 
European integration and does not fit with the 
member-country-based representation in the 
Fund. On a more economic level, it is sometimes 
argued that growing specialisation and 
integration within a currency union leads to an 
increase in gross flows between the members of 
the currency union, which tends to overstate the 
real degree of openness of these countries. 
Moreover, since flows within a currency union 
take place in the same currency, there is no 
exchange rate risk and hence less need for 
access to Fund resources.
Excluding intra-euro area trade flows from the 
openness variable for the euro area countries 
would reduce their calculated quota share by 
over 9 percentage points under the current five-
formula approach.43 The same exercise for all 
EU countries results in a reduction of the 
calculated quota share of up to 12 percentage 
points. These are considerable quantities; 
however, when it comes to a reduction of the 
calculated quota share, it has to be kept in mind 
that the euro area has a reserve buffer in terms 
of under-representation of around 5 percentage 
points.
Table 21 Contributions of selected IMF members to facilities supporting low-income countries 
(SDR millions, as of end-2006)
Source: IMF, “Update on the financing of the Fund’s concessional assistance and debt-relief to low-income member countries”, 4 April 2007.
Note: The abbreviations in the table stand for Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), External Shock Facility (ESF) and 















Trusts relative to 
quota share
Total 3,185.7 1,561.6 4,747.3 100.0 100.0
Major industral countries 2,115.2 880.5 2,995.7 63.1 45.2 far above
Canada 210.4 48.8 259.2 5.5 2.9 well above
France 369.3 82.2 451.5 9.5 4.9 well above
Germany 178.5 127.2 305.7 6.4 6.0 broadly in line
Italy 131.5 63.6 195.1 4.1 3.2 above
Japan 648.4 144.0 792.4 16.7 6.1 well above
United Kingdom 419.7 82.2 501.9 10.6 4.9 well above
United States 157.3 332.6 489.9 10.3 17.1 far below
Other advanced countries 890.2 299.7 1,189.9 25.1 17.0 above
Australia 15.5 24.8 40.3 0.8 1.5 far below
Austria 59.4 14.3 73.7 1.6 0.9 above
Belgium 105.6 35.3 140.9 3.0 2.1 above
Denmark 63.7 18.5 82.2 1.7 0.8 well above
Finland 40.9 8.0 48.9 1.0 0.6 above
Greece 36.0 6.3 42.3 0.9 0.4 above
Ireland 7.6 5.9 13.5 0.3 0.4 broadly in line
Korea 59.7 15.9 75.6 1.6 1.3 above
Luxembourg 12.8 0.7 13.5 0.3 0.1 above
Netherlands 128.5 45.4 173.9 3.7 2.4 above
Norway 42.3 18.5 60.8 1.3 0.8 above
Portugal 4.0 6.6 10.6 0.2 0.4 below
Spain 17.7 23.3 41.0 0.9 1.4 below
Sweden 174.0 18.3 192.3 4.1 1.1 well above
Switzerland 101.0 37.0 138.0 2.9 1.6 well above
Fuel exporting countries 20.4 114.3 134.7 2.8 8.4 far below
Rest of the World 148.1 224.1 372.2 7.8 29.4 far below
43  The figures in this paragraph are based on data which take 2004 
as the most recent year.
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However, such an operation cannot be limited 
to one currency area alone. For reasons of 
consistency and equal treatment, the exclusion 
of intra-currency union trade would need to 
apply to all monetary unions, even if, as is most 
likely, only the case of the euro area would 
have a significant effect on the Fund. Other 
regional currency unions recognised by the 
IMF include the Eastern Caribbean Currency 
Union, the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Union and the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (see Table 22). Excluding 
intra-currency area trade from the openness 
variable for these small and/or lower-income 
countries would punish their efforts to increase 
regional integration to the extent that a common 
currency raises intra-region trade (this impact 
differing from union to union).
More generally, it is difficult to determine 
whether currency unions in general are an 
important driver of intra-currency area trade. 
And it has to be recognised that increased intra-
regional trade and vertical integration are by no 
means a phenomenon limited to currency 
Table 22 Regional currency unions and countries using the same legal tender




Euro area Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain 22.89 27.50
Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Union (ECCU)
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines1) 0.03 0.02
Central African 
Economic and Monetary 
Union (CEMAC)
Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of 
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon
0.26 0.17
West African Economic 
and Monetary Union 
(WEAMU)
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, and Togo
0.39 0.14
Other groupings using 
the same legal tender:
Euro Euro area, San Marino, and Montenegro 22.91 27.53
US dollar United States, El Salvador, Panama, Ecuador, Timor-Leste, Palau, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and general acceptance in Bahamas, 
Barbados, and Belize 17.50 16.53
Indian rupee India, and Bhutan 1.91 1.29
Australian dollar Australia, Kiribati 1.49 1.21





Source: Authors’ calculation; see also Winkler et al. (2004) for a comprehensive overview of cases of dollarisation/euroisation.
1) In addition, the ECCU includes two dependent territories of the United Kingdom, namely Anguilla and Montserrat.
unions. As argued above (see the section on the 
openness variable), extending the production 
chain across borders is one of the central 
features of globalisation. More specifically, 
increased integration is also relevant to other 
trading regimes, such as free trade areas, 
customs unions or common markets. Given the 
large number of such arrangements worldwide 
– as at December 2006 as many as 368 regional 
trading arrangements had been notified to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) – virtually 
all IMF members take part in a regional 
integration scheme.44 Hence the difficult 
question would be where to draw the line for 
the purpose of quota calculations. Finally, data 
availability might also be an issue, since the 
directions of international exchange statistics 
for services, income and transfers are more 
difficult to ascertain than for trade.
44  In addition, countries introducing a foreign currency as their 
own legal tender replicate the characteristics of a currency 
union. Even specific cross-border arrangements like the 
maquiladora programme between the United States and Mexico 
give rise to specialisation and considerable re-exports.49
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The argument that currency union membership 
would lower the need for Fund assistance might 
be true for the specific case of the euro area 
since it seems highly unlikely that euro area 
countries would have recourse to the Fund. 
However, in principle they remain entitled to 
such assistance like any other Fund member 
and like a number of Caribbean and African 
countries that received Fund support while 
participating in a currency union. Having the 
same currency eliminates exchange rate-driven 
disturbances of the balance of payments but 
does not preclude other potential sources of 
risk, e.g. macroeconomic, political or liability-
related risks. Reserve pooling arrangements 
among currency union members are also not 
unique to currency unions (see for instance the 
Chiang Mai initiative). Moreover, if the 
argument that the absence of exchange rate risk 
leads less need for Fund support were to hold 
generally, the question arises whether it would 
need to apply not only to currency union 
members but also to economies using the same 
legal tender. Even though their monetary 
governance framework differs fundamentally 
from that of currency unions, an exchange rate 
risk with trading partners using the same 
currency can be considered as excluded.
4.2.5 POPULATION
Population as a variable was discussed in the 
early days of Bretton Woods. It would obviously 
make the Fund more “democratic” but is not 
straightforward to square with the notion of a 
financial institution. Yet, through the notion of 
basic votes, of which the same number is given 
to all members, the Fund shows a conceptual 
opening for a democratic representation, 
although basic votes are not related to 
population.
The introduction of a population variable has 
the potential to lead to massive changes in the 
quota distribution. A radical switch from the 
status quo to a representation based solely on 
population would mean that of the largest 20 
IMF members only 9 countries would remain in 
this group, which would then be led by India 
and China. If all quotas were to be distributed 
according to countries’ shares in world 
population, advanced economies would have a 
share of only 15%, whereas they currently hold 
around 60% of actual quotas. Conversely, the 
share of developing countries, which is currently 
roughly 40% of actual quotas, would rise to 
85%.
Interestingly, population is distributed almost 
as unequally among IMF members as GDP 
based on market exchange rates. China and 
India (the top two) together account for 38% of 
the world’s population, whereas the top 10 
makes up 60%. The respective figures for the 
GDP variable are 40% and 70%. This indicates 
that even a population variable would be no 
substitute for basic votes because it too would 
lead to a concentration of quotas on a few 
members, albeit on a different group compared 
with current variables. 
Of course, even proponents of this concept 
would probably only argue for a limited role for 
population in a quota formula. Interestingly, 
however, population is relatively closely 
correlated with GDP based on PPP (0.69). 
Various quota formula simulations show 
that population can provide a relatively close 
proxy for PPP-based GDP.45 Nine out of the 
top 15 countries in terms of population (see 
Table 23) also appear in the top 15 ranking of 
PPP-based GDP.
This correlation can be used in further 
discussions in two ways: one could argue that 
in view of this link population, as a non-
economic variable, should not be further 
considered and PPP-based GDP should be 
favoured instead. Or one could turn the argument 
around, suggesting that given the data problems 
of PPP-based GDP and the fact that population 
data are generally available, the latter should be 
used in a new formula. But all in all it would 
not be straightforward to let population size 
45  A scenario in which population were given a weight of 5% and 
market-rate-based GDP a weight of 45% would closely mirror 
the results of a scenario with a blended GDP variable at a 50% 
weight, of which 25% would be PPP and 75% market-rate-based 
GDP.
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determine the institutional governance of an 
institution dealing with monetary stability of 
the world economy.
4.3 WEIGHTS  OF  INDIVIDUAL  VARIABLES
Not only the choice of variables, but also the 
choice of their respective weights in a new 
formula is a decision that is not straightforward. 
Since different variables favour different 
countries, there are not only conceptual but also 
distributional issues involved.
The IMF’s Board of Governors has given some 
guidance, requiring that “consideration be 
given” to placing “significantly higher weight 
on members’ gross domestic product” and 
ensuring that “other variables, in particular the 
openness of members’ economies, also play an 
important role.” Given that openness today has 
a far higher weight than GDP (see Chapter 3) it 
is not evident whether the weight assigned to 
GDP should be larger or smaller than that 
assigned to openness. Other variables are not 
mentioned explicitly but the use of the plural 
Table 23 The 15 members with the largest population size
Source: Authors’ calculation.





1 China 1,323 20.6 15.2 3.7
2 India 1,103 17.2 5.9 1.9
3 United States 298 4.6 20.5 17.1
4 Indonesia 223 3.5 1.6 1.0
5 Brazil 186 2.9 2.6 1.4
6 Pakistan 158 2.5 0.7 0.5
7 Russia 143 2.2 2.6 2.7
8 Bangladesh 142 2.2 0.5 0.2
9 Nigeria 132 2.1 0.3 0.8
10 Japan 128 2.0 6.6 6.1
11 Mexico 107 1.7 1.8 1.4
12 Germany 83 1.3 4.3 6.0
13 Philippines 83 1.3 0.7 0.4
14 Vietnam 83 1.3 0.4 0.2
15 Ethiopia 77 1.2 0.1 0.1
per memoriam:
Euro area 310 4.9 15.4 22.9
suggests that there is at least one more variable 
beyond GDP and openness to be considered. 
Hence the menu of options includes the use of 
two to four variables, if, to limit complexity, 
the number is not to rise above the current 
level.
The decision on the weights to be assigned to 
the variables is ultimately a matter of judgement 
and political compromise. Given that countries’ 
shares in the various variables differ significantly 
(see Table 24), so will their preferences. A 
higher GDP share is advantageous only for the 
group of G7 countries, whereas openness 
generally favours advanced economies. A higher 
weight for variability has a varied impact on the 
different groups, and reserves clearly favour the 
emerging markets.
These potential gains and losses also illustrate 
that it will be difficult to design a new formula 
that does not contain all the four variables 
included in the current system. This also 
explains why in Chapter 2 one of the illustrative 
formulae comprised all four variables.51
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4.4  THE MATHEMATICAL SHAPE OF A NEW 
FORMULA
The Singapore resolution states that a new quota 
formula should provide a simpler and more 
transparent means of capturing members’ 
relative positions in the world economy. What 
does this imply in practical terms for the design 
of the new formula? It can be read as saying that 
the formula should provide for an intuitive and 
stable relationship between the variables and 
the calculated quota shares. Translated into 
mathematical terms, this implies that a new 
formula should have the following technical 
properties:
–  Homogeneity: a uniform change for all 
members in all variables (such as a doubling 
of amounts) should leave members’ 
calculated quota shares unchanged.
–  Monotonicity: if the value of one variable in 
the formula increases, the formula outcome 
should also increase.
–  Non-convexity: the outcome should not 
increase over-proportionally if the value of an 
underlying variable rises. The marginal impact 
of a variable on the quota should be either 
constant or decline as the variable increases. 
The current five-formula system does not fulfil 
these requirements. As mentioned above, fast 
growing countries can have a lower calculated 
quota share if their GDP is rising faster than 
their exports. In addition, a doubling of all 
variables would not be neutral in the current 
system, as it would not leave the quota 
distribution unchanged.
One first question that needs to be addressed is 
the issue of whether variables should enter the 
formula in absolute levels, as in the existing 
five formulae, or be expressed as shares. A 
formula with variables in levels has some 
drawbacks. The relative importance of the 
variables is less transparent and difficult to 
interpret since the coefficients of the variables 
cannot be interpreted as true weights and 
therefore may change over time.46 The use of 
variables in shares is more transparent, as their 
coefficients explicitly represent the weights of 
the individual variables and remain stable over 
time. Thus, the importance of a variable is 
directly observable. Given these considerations, 
variables in shares seem to be preferable for the 
new quota formula.
Table 24 Shares in variables compared with respective calculated quota shares
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: An “H” indicates that a variable share is higher than the respective calculated quota share.












Euro area 27.50 22.83 32.11 H 23.67 5.02
Total EU 37.77 31.00 43.74 H 31.26 11.42
G7 45.90 62.64 H 47.72 H 43.27 29.54
other EU 18.24 10.71 19.75 H 17.87 7.14
other G20 19.10 17.78 17.64 18.66 40.66 H
Rest of the world 16.77 8.86 14.89 20.19 H 22.65 H
Sum: 100 100 100 100 100
ROW of which:
ROW: Other Advanced 3.19 2.07 3.44 H 3.49 H 3.31 H
ROW: Developing 13.58 6.80 11.45 16.71 H 19.34 H
African Constit.-19 1.32 0.99 1.16 1.70 H 1.61 H
African Constit.-24 0.41 0.26 0.38 0.66 H 0.31
46  The implicit weights are a result of multiplications of coefficients 
and the sum of a variable over all members and normalised over 
all variables, which means that they change over time and are 
not directly observable.
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In principle, both linear and multiplicative 
formulae which use variable shares have the 
above-mentioned properties and are thus 
preferable to the current five-formula system 
(see Table 25).
A linear formula, in which individual variables 
are added, has many advantages. It is 
straightforward and intuitive, and the 
coefficients can be interpreted as weights 
(provided that they are positive and sum to 
unity). Hence members’ relative positions are 
directly observable. Moreover, the coefficients 
have an easy interpretation, as they represent 
the percentage point impact on the calculated 
quota share of a given percentage point change 
in the member’s share of the variable in 
question. The elasticity of a calculated quota 
share in respect to a variable share is always 
positive but varies across the membership. 
A multiplicative formula, which is homogenous 
of the degree α+β+γ+δ, features constant 
elasticities of variables across members; i.e. a 
percentage increase in a variable would have 
the same proportional impact on the calculated 
quota share for all members. However, the 
interpretation of the exponents as weights is 
less straightforward than in the case of a linear 
formula,47 partly because of a rescaling factor 
k, which is necessary to ensure that quota shares 
sum to unity. Therefore the calculated quota 
share of a country depends on the distribution 
of variable shares among the other members. 
This implies that a country’s calculated quota 
share can be altered by a change in other 
members’ variable shares and the resulting 
necessary change in k, even if its own variable 
shares remain unchanged. This does not happen 
with a linear formula. In addition, a greater 
dispersion of individual shares leads to a lower 
calculated quota share, since the result of 
multiplication is higher when values are 
similar.
4.5  THE ISSUE OF COMPRESSION
Any formula that gives GDP at market exchange 
rates a higher weight than today is bound to 
significantly raise the calculated share of the 
United States and some other advanced 
economies, and to lower that of smaller and 
poorer countries. Likewise, a formula with a 
high weight for PPP-based GDP would create 
new outliers, i.e. especially China, whose 
weight in the global economy reaches 15% on 
this measure. One way to avoid outliers with 
very high calculated quota shares and to 
rebalance the quota distribution somewhat 
would be to use a compression factor. 
Compression would shift calculated quota 
shares from countries with higher shares to 
those with lower shares. Although it affects 
members’ relative sizes, it would maintain their 
relative positions and hence leave their ranking 
unchanged. 
Technically, compression can be used for any 
linear or multiplicative formula by applying 
a positive exponent smaller than unity. For 
example, consider the linear formula Qi = αAi 
+  βBi + γCi + δDi. With compression, it 
becomes Qi = k (αAi + βBi + γCi + δDi)c, where 
the exponent c indicates the degree of 
compression. The lower this compression factor 
c, the higher the compression effect, i.e. the 
more compressed the distribution. It means 
Table 25 Linear and multiplicative formulae
Notation: Qi: calculated quota share of country i; Ai, Bi, Ci, Di: variable shares for country i (assuming four variables); α, β, γ, δ: Variable 
weights, which are positive and add up to 1; k: Rescaling factor to ensure that calculated quota shares for all countries add up to 
100%.
Linear formula Multiplicative formula





47  In case of a multiplicative formula, the coefficients reflect the 
weights for a percentage change after a logarithmic 
transformation of the variable.53
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that when one of the variables A, B, C or D 
increases by 1, the quota share increases only 
by 1c which is less than 1 for c<1. The rescaling 
factor k guarantees that all Qi add up to 
100%.48
To see the effect of compression in the context 
of the IMF quota formula reform, consider the 
following formula with and without 
compression: 
without compression:   
(1) Q = (0.5 Y + 0.3 O + 0.15 VC + 0.05 R)
with compression:  
(2) Q = k (0.5 Y + 0.3 O + 0.15 VC + 0.05 R)  0.9
The effect of compression for IMF members 
with the formula above is shown in Chart 13.
As can be seen from the charts above, 
compression leads to a hump-shaped distribution 
of quota shares, with countries below a certain 
quota share – in this example just above 3.0% 
– benefiting from the compression, and the 
others losing share. In other words, the 
calculated quota shares of the members move 
towards each other, hence the term 
“compression”. Moreover, it is important to 
note that larger countries with high quota shares 
see a considerable reduction (especially the 
United States) while the smaller countries gain 
only marginally. This is explained by the fact 
that the mass of the calculated quota shares is 
redistributed from very few members (with the 
formula in this example only eight countries 
have a calculated quota share larger than 3%) 
to 177 members whose share is below this 
threshold.
Such rebalancing of quota shares through 
compression would follow the same reasoning 
as the justification of basic votes, namely that 
in an institution such as the IMF the relationship 
between a member’s economic size and its 
quota or voting share should not be purely 
linear. Compression would reduce the dispersion 
of members’ quota shares and could thus 
Chart 13 Calculated quota shares before and after compression
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: The 45 degree line in both charts shows the distribution of quota shares without compression. The other curve gives the 
distribution with compression. The right-hand panel is a magnified section of the left-hand panel.
x-axis: CQS before compression
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48  A special case is that of c=0.5, which corresponds to the square-
root formula developed by Lionel Penrose in 1946. We do not 
pursue this further here, as it is based on representation of 
citizens, not countries. Penrose found that the effective voting 
power of a citizen, i.e. the probability of being decisive in a 
vote, roughly corresponds to 1/√(N), with N being the population 
of the country. It has therefore been suggested that, in a multi-
country setting, each country should receive a weight of √N to 
ensure an equal representation of citizens across countries.
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contribute to enhancing the cohesion of the 
Fund. In terms of beneficiaries, compression 
would increase the quota shares of all developing 
and emerging market countries, with the notable 
exception of China, which is one of the countries 
having a quota share above 3% and likely to 
lose with compression.
A comparison with income taxation may 
illustrate the different effects of basic votes and 
compression. Basic votes compare to a lump-
sum tax-exempt amount, while compression 
compares to the progressiveness of the tax 
schedule. For low-income earners whose 
income either falls entirely into the exemption 
range or is close to it the exemption threshold 
is of paramount importance in determining their 
after-tax income position. For high-income 
earners, in contrast, it makes little difference 
whether the exemption threshold is moved; the 
bulk of their tax liability arises from income 
above this threshold being taxed progressively, 
and the top marginal tax rate will generally be 
most important variable in determining their 
after-tax income position.
Hence, just as both an exemption and a 
progressive tariff are part of tax schedules in 
most countries, compression and basic votes 
not only have their separate justification but 
can also be combined to derive voting shares 
from economic weight. Both are simple, 
transparent and well-understood tools to 
introduce equity considerations into members’ 
voice in an organisation.
It is also interesting to note that virtually all 
organisations employ one or both these tools to 
achieve a greater balance in representation than 
“pure” underlying variables would suggest (see 
Table 26). For the ECB, its capital key is strictly 
proportional to underlying variables, yet each 
member of the ECB’s Governing Council has 
one vote.
4.6  THE ISSUE OF BASIC VOTES
Ensuring an adequate voice for low-income 
countries has been regarded as a central element 
of the Singapore reform package. Since it was 
recognised that quota increases would lead to 
an erosion of the voting shares of low-income 
countries, the entering into effect of the second-
round increases was made dependent on the 
amendment of the Articles of Agreement to 
raise the number of basic votes. The precise 
size of the increase was left open, since it will 
also depend on the amount of the quota increase. 
Table 26 Equity considerations in selected institutions and in the area of taxation
Institution/policy area Tool Comment
IMF Executive Board Basic votes Small impact (currently only 2% of votes)
EU Council More votes per head for 
smaller countries
EU Parliament More seats per head for 
smaller countries
A minimum level of 5 and a maximum level of 99 seats provide for a 
greater number of seats per head for smaller countries. 
ECB capital key  none The shares of the national central banks in the ECB’s capital key are 
weighted according to the shares of the respective Member States in the 
total population and the GDP of the EU, in equal measure. 
ECB Governing Council One person, one vote Governing Council members vote in their personal capacity. 
ECB Governing Council 
(following euro area 
enlargement)
Rotation scheme See “The adjustment of voting modalities in the Governing Council”, ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, May 2003.
Taxation Minimum exempt income 
and progressive income 
tax
A combination of the two instruments has a significant impact on the 
after-tax income distribution. Minimum exempt income is a significant 
share of average low incomes, and the marginal tax ratio rises 
considerably with rising incomes in most countries. 
Source: Authors’ compilation.55
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The resolution merely stipulates that basic 
votes should be at least doubled and sufficient 
to preserve the existing voting shares of low-
income countries as a group. It also calls on the 
Executive Board to ensure that the share of 
basic votes in total votes remains constant in 
future.
An increase in basic votes would benefit 
those countries whose quota share is below 
the average quota share.49 How does the 
redistribution of shares via basic votes compare 
that achieved by compression? Chart 14 shows 
both measures. Compression leads to a hump-
shaped curve which intersects with the bisector 
at around 3% – depending on the formula 
and the characteristics of the members. The 
blue area right of the intersection is 
redistributed to the left; hence countries with a 
share larger than 3% give part of their share to 
countries below 3%. The introduction of basic 
votes leads to a different redistribution pattern 
with a considerably lower threshold. The dotted 
line crosses the bisector at around 0.54%, 
meaning that countries above this give up 
share (see shaded area) in favour of countries 
with smaller shares. Thus, a combination of 
compression and basic votes leads to three 
different groups of countries: the group of 
members with the smallest shares are 
beneficiaries of both measures; members with 
intermediate-sized shares profit from 
compression only; and countries with larger 
shares lose from both redistribution 
instruments. 
Table 27 lists the voting shares of EU countries 
after different increases in basic votes to 
illustrate the impact of basic votes; all scenarios 
are based on the current distribution of actual 
quota. It can be seen that countries below an 
actual quota share of 0.54% win while the 
others lose; the higher the basic votes are the 
more pronounced the effect. A look at the two 
aggregates reveals that both the euro area and 
the total EU are contributors rather than 
recipients in the redistribution.
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49  With 185 members the average quota share is 100/185 = 0.54.
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4.7  HOW WILL A NEW FORMULA CHANGE 
ACTUAL QUOTAS?
Agreement on a new formula will not change 
anything in the distribution of actual quota 
shares in the Fund as long as no actual 
adjustments take place. For this reason, the 
Singapore reform package included a 
commitment to a second round of ad hoc quota 
increases “with a view to achieving a significant 
further alignment of members’ quotas with their 
relative positions in the world economy, based 
on the new quota formula.” Since it is well 
understood that this second ad hoc increase will 
not be sufficient to address all misalignments, 
it was also envisaged in Singapore that later 
general quota reviews would focus on the 
objective of realigning members’ positions.50  
Table 27 Voting shares of EU countries after different increases in basic votes
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: To replicate the share of basic votes in total votes at the IMF’s inception and in the late 1950s, approximately 1,500 and 2,200 
basic votes respectively would be needed today.
Actual quota 
share
Voting share Voting shares after an increase 
in basic votes to...
status quo (250 basic votes) 500 1,000 1,500 2,200
Euro area 22.89 22.56 22.24 21.65 21.09 20.39
Germany 5.98 5.87 5.76 5.55 5.36 5.12
France 4.94 4.84 4.76 4.59 4.44 4.24
Italy 3.24 3.19 3.13 3.03 2.94 2.82
Netherlands 2.37 2.33 2.30 2.23 2.17 2.08
Belgium 2.12 2.08 2.05 1.99 1.94 1.87
Spain 1.40 1.38 1.37 1.33 1.30 1.27
Austria 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.81
Finland 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57
Portugal 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42
Ireland 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41
Greece 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.40
Luxembourg 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19
Slovenia 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17
Total EU 32.36 31.99 31.64 30.97 30.35 29.56
United Kingdom 4.94 4.84 4.76 4.59 4.44 4.24
Sweden 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.01
Denmark 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72
Poland 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62
Hungary 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49
Romania 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Czech Republic 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.40
Bulgaria 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33
Slovakia 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.22
Lithuania 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.14
Cyprus 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
Latvia 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13
Malta 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12
Estonia 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11
But at the same time, the traditional logic of 
ensuring that the Fund has sufficient liquidity 
– or conversely that there is a liquidity need 
that justifies a quota increase – will come back 
to the forefront in the context of these general 
reviews. Given that the two rounds of quota 
increases in the context of the Singapore 
resolution will further augment the Fund’s 
already comfortable liquidity situation, it is not 
evident that the next general review – which 
will take place between 2008 and 2013 – will 
also conclude with a quota increase. This 
uncertainty in terms of the timing and of 
outcome of any future correction to the quota 
50  The report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors 
also mentions that it plans to consider, as part of the reform 
programme, whether to amend the Articles of Agreement so as 
to clearly specify this objective in the Articles themselves.57
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distribution explains the importance being 
placed on the second ad hoc quota increase to 
be agreed at the latest by the Annual Meetings 
2008.
The details of this second round of quota 
increases were deliberately left open in 
Singapore. There was an understanding that the 
rebalancing of quota shares should be 
“significant” and that a broader range of 
countries could be included. In addition, the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee 
(IMFC) Statement of 14 April 2007 gave 
another indication, stating that the second ad 
hoc increase should result in a “higher share for 
dynamic economies, many of which are 
emerging markets economies, whose weight 
and role in the global economy have increased”. 
This language has to be seen as a compromise 
in the sense that it does not refer to emerging 
market economies as a group as these had 
wished.
Against this background, policy-makers need 
to reach agreement on a full set of issues. How 
large should the second-round increase be in 
comparison with total IMF quotas, given that 
the first round amounted to 1.8%? How many 
countries should benefit? If all under-
represented countries were to benefit, this 
would imply either a large total quota increase 
or a tiny correction of countries’ under- and 
over-representation. If only a subgroup were to 
benefit, how many countries should be chosen, 
on the basis of which criteria, and how much of 
countries’ under-representation should be 
corrected?51
An important issue will also be what to do with 
those countries which are currently over-
represented but might be qualified as “dynamic 
economies”, such as India or Brazil. If they are 
not part of the group that receives a quota 
increase, their quota shares will automatically 
fall. On the other hand, any quota increase they 
were to receive would limit the amount available 
for others.
Another issue relates to advanced economies, 
specifically whether they are prepared to forego 
all or part of the quota increase they would be 
entitled to. The United States has repeatedly 
announced its willingness to limit the increase 
it requests to that which would achieve the level 
of its quota share prior to the Singapore 
resolution, i.e. 17.4%. At the same time it has 
invited others to follow its example – which is 
an implicit acceptance of an ad hoc increase for 
under-represented European countries back to 
their pre-Singapore level. This issue is even 
mentioned in the report of the Executive Board 
to the Board of Governors, which states that 
“Large advanced economies that already have a 
sizable voting power in the Fund and that prove 
to be eligible for ad hoc increases in the second 
round may be willing to consider foregoing, or 
at least limiting, the increases that they request. 
This would augment the quota increases 
available for other under-represented members 
for a given aggregate increase in quotas”.
In any case, the second-round quota increase is 
not likely to fully eliminate the issue of under-
representation, because this would necessitate 
a very high total quota increase as long as over-
represented countries do not give up quotas.52 
Since countries cannot be forced to give up 
quotas, and are not likely to do so, the under-
represented countries would need to be given 
much higher quotas than the gap between their 
calculated and actual quota shares suggests in 
order to bring down the actual quota shares of 
over-represented countries to the latter’s 
respective calculated quota shares. This would 
imply the need for a total quota increase which 
could – depending on the formula and hence the 
calculated quota shares – be as high as 800% if 
51  The criteria used for the selection of the countries that benefited 
in the first round of ad hoc increases were the individual 
variables used in the formulae. The four countries were the only 
ones that were both substantially under-represented on the basis 
of the existing formulae and their shares in GDP, openness, 
variability and reserves. 
52 The elimination of all under-representation implies also the 
elimination of all over-representation. If all over-represented 
countries were to give up quotas, which would be reallocated to 
those under-represented, obviously no increase would be 
necessary.
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under-representation were to be completely 
eliminated.
It should also be borne in mind that any 
significant quota increase for under-represented 
countries leads to a new problem – a kind of 
“collateral damage” – namely that formerly 
over-represented countries might become 
under-represented, thus increasing the number 
of under-represented countries. While their 
absolute quotas would be unchanged, their 
quota shares would fall as a consequence of the 
quota increase given to others. To mitigate this 
problem, an “insurance” mechanism could be 
established that retained part of the total quota 
increase and allotted it to those countries that 
would otherwise become under-represented 
after the ad hoc increase.53 The cost of the 
insurance in terms of necessary quota is small 
(see Table 28). In the case of our illustrative 
formula No 1 and a second-round ad hoc 
increase of 5%, the insurance cost is 4.5%, 
i.e. 4.5% of the quota increase is diverted to 
countries which would otherwise switch from 
being over-represented to under-represented 
as a result of the ad hoc increase. This 
insurance mechanism could guarantee that 
the number of under-represented members does 
not increase – which would be a paradoxical 
outcome of an operation aiming to diminish 
under-representation – and would thus also 
contribute to enhancing the acceptability of the 
quota allocation.
4.8 SUMMARY
This chapter has offered an analysis of the 
various avenues for reform. Starting with the 
rationale of the quota system, it has reviewed 
existing and possible new variables for a 
formula to determine quota shares and has 
discussed weights, functional form and special 
issues, including PPP conversion, compression 
and basic votes.
The chapter has shown that of the existing four 
variables,54 the justification for two of them has 
weakened. Including reserves is more difficult 
to justify in a world where accumulation has 
taken place to at times “excessive levels” by 
countries’ own admission, and at times as a 
result of misaligned currencies. Variability is 
more difficult to justify in a framework where 
transparency is crucial. Moreover, it does not 
unambiguously favour less developed or 
“vulnerable” countries but also the large and 
advanced economies heavily involved in 
international trade and finance, which are 
unlikely to draw on Fund financial support. 
Hence the justification for including variability 
as a reflection of vulnerability and potential 
access to IMF resources has also weakened.
The chapter has explored options for new 
variables, in particular financial openness and 
PPP conversion rates. Financial openness 
clearly seems a desirable concept, reflecting 
growing global financial integration and a 
continued role for the IMF in financial issues 
ranging from capital account liberalisation via 
financial sector assessment programmes to 
global financial stability analysis. The main 
53  If not all under-represented countries belonged to the group of 
beneficiaries of the quota increase, one could think – in addition 
– of a second insurance mechanism which would guarantee that 
the quota increase did not worsen the situation of any under-
represented country.
54 The two separate variables “current payments” and “current 
receipts” are understood as one variable in principle.
Table 28 Costs of insurance against “collateral damage” as a result of a quota increase
No Formula Insurance cost (%)
1 Q1 = (0.5 GDP + 0.5 Openness)0.9 4.51
2 Q2 = (0.5 GDP + 0.3 Openness + 0.15 Variability + 0.05 Reserves)0.9 0.65
3 Q3 = (0.4 GDP + 0.4 Openness + 0.2 GDP at PPP)0.9 5.22
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: A second-round quota increase for all under-represented members amounting to 5% of total quota is assumed. For a discussion 
of these formulae see Chapter 2.59
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problem in this area, however, remains data 
availability and comparability, which require 
considerable technical work. Moreover, policy-
makers need to be aware that an inclusion of 
financial variables in openness would shift 
further quotas to advanced economies. Even 
emerging market economies are only beginning 
to play a more significant role in international 
financial integration, and developing economies 
matter very little so far. Hence, if one wanted to 
avoid a further concentration of quotas among 
advanced economies, one would have to use 
other levers to offset the quota shift towards 
these economies arising from financial openness 
in the formula.
One of these possible levers is to use PPP 
conversion rates to compare GDP internationally. 
This would clearly shift quota towards emerging 
and developing economies but has a weak 
conceptual bearing in an international financial 
institution. The chapter has also explored the 
features of two other parameters to boost the 
representation of smaller and/or low-income 
countries, an existing one – basic votes – and a 
new one: compression. Both are simple and 
transparent, both are well established concepts 
(corresponding to income thresholds and 
progressive tax schedules, respectively, in 
public finance) which can be employed to alter 
the outcome of strong principle and market-
based variables, and the two can be combined.
With this analysis, the chapter has aimed to 
illustrate the key choices for policy-makers; 
the three illustrative formulae previewed in 
Chapter 2 are consistent with possible main 
avenues of reform.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Quota discussions are among the most difficult 
issues for the Fund membership to deal with. It 
is probably no exaggeration when observers 
speak of a “rancorous history of IMF quota 
negotiations” (Truman, 2006, p.71). These 
discussions involve to a large extent 
distributional issues that are inherently 
politically sensitive. In a system in which 
countries strive for influence relative to others, 
quota reviews are a zero-sum game and by 
definition leave part of the membership 
dissatisfied. With such dissatisfaction, there is 
a risk that countries disengage from the Fund 
and thus from the framework of international 
monetary cooperation. Over the long run, this 
may weaken the status of the IMF and the 
stability and efficiency of the global economy, 
to the extent that the institutional framework 
for dealing with macroeconomic challenges 
arising from globalisation is no longer robust.
The difficulty of quota discussions results from 
a combination of two factors: first, an objective 
framework that is criticised for being 
excessively complex and not transparent; 
second, subjective judgement reflected in past 
quota adjustments that is criticised for being 
unfair, especially to non-advanced economies, 
by not closing sufficiently, or sufficiently 
rapidly, the gaps that have emerged in 
representation. The problem of intransparency 
and political quarrelling over quotas has 
accompanied the IMF since its inception. The 
economist who developed the first formula at 
the Bretton Woods Conference wrote that 
already at the Bretton Woods conference “more 
than half of the delegates strongly objected to 
the quotas for their countries, and several 
demanded to know how the quotas had been 
calculated” (Mikesell, 1994, p. 35-36).
Quota discussions, which are comparable to 
internal restructuring in organisations, are also 
difficult internally, absorbing considerable 
resources. Executive Board time is spent on a 
matter that does not directly serve the outside 
world but is by definition inward-looking. An 
institution that is meant to provide a public 
service to the outside world is bound up in itself 
every five years for sometimes a year or more 
with the issues of quotas and internal 
representation.
These considerations beg the question of 
whether quota discussions are necessary at all. 
Is it necessary that the Fund discusses on an 
almost continuous basis how shares and voting 
weights are attributed to its members, reviewing 
both the formula and the adjustments to the 
formula results? Would it be preferable to 
devise a simple, transparent formula that 
balances economic and equity considerations 
clearly, with adjustments being made to actual 
weights of members as economic developments 
warrant? Hence the open question is whether 
the current review also offers a more far-
reaching opportunity, namely to find rules of 
representation and voice that are accepted 
beyond question and that can work lastingly. 
Today, this possibility may seem remote. For 
the Fund to make a step in this direction, it 
would take a formula that is not only simple 
and transparent but also balances efficiency and 
equity considerations by construction. Perhaps 
the outcome of the Quota Review Group of 
1999/2000 was not accepted because it focused 
too much on efficiency and thereby unduly 
favoured the developed world and the largest 
economies in particular. A market-based 
approach that includes a clear element of 
fairness – such as compression and a 
considerable increase in basic votes – could be 
a step in the right direction. 
If such a framework is combined with significant 
quota increases for under-represented countries, 
the Fund may – gradually – move to a situation 
in which ad hoc quota adjustments will no 
longer be needed. This would take political 
discussions out of the institution and free 
resources for more important tasks involved in 
contributing to the stable and efficient 
functioning of the global economy.
The purpose of this paper has been to shed some 
light on the many technical aspects of the quota 61
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debate, by analysing the intricacies of under 
and over-representation at the Fund under the 
status quo and by analysing various solutions 
for a new formula.
The paper started with the anecdote of 
Columbus’ egg. There exists also a slightly 
different version, which is somewhat less well 
documented and perhaps less authentic, but no 
less charming. This anecdote has it that 
Columbus was planning his discovery voyage 
and was trying to raise financial support for the 
trip. But he was having trouble convincing 
people that his project had a chance of success. 
So by way of demonstration, he picked up an 
egg. “Is it possible to set this egg down on its 
tip?” he asked. “Of course not, everyone knows 
that!” people replied. Columbus set the egg 
down hard on its tip, using enough force to 
break the shell a little so that the egg stood up 
on the flattened tip. – “Oh, you mean like that? 
That’s easy!” – “Yes”, Columbus replied, “it’s 
easy once you know it. It’s a little harder to 
trust in something that hasn’t been discovered 
yet.”
This paper does not claim to have found the 
answer or the egg – it merely hopes to signal a 
few possible routes on the voyage towards the 
discovery of a new – simple and transparent, 
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Basic data 1)









GDP Openness Variablity Reserves PPP
1 United States 17.076 16.284 16.732 28.893 15.048 20.728 2.061 20.467
2 Japan 6.119 7.011 6.003 11.003 5.313 6.870 22.279 6.615
3 Germany 5.979 6.850 5.866 6.550 8.662 6.024 1.415 4.313
4 France 4.936 4.129 4.844 4.544 5.015 3.157 1.000 3.112
5 United Kingdom 4.936 5.240 4.844 5.088 6.312 2.383 1.046 3.095
6 China 3.719 6.137 3.652 5.227 5.612 3.384 19.448 15.217
7 Italy 3.243 3.317 3.187 4.105 3.996 1.830 0.817 2.872
8 Saudi Arabia 3.211 1.030 3.155 0.636 0.874 0.814 0.677 0.576
9 Canada 2.928 3.065 2.878 2.455 3.369 2.282 0.923 1.856
10 Russia 2.733 1.702 2.687 1.462 1.491 2.183 3.953 2.571
11 Netherlands 2.373 2.897 2.335 1.459 3.428 1.318 0.295 0.861
12 Belgium 2.117 2.270 2.084 0.855 2.592 1.877 0.256 0.553
13 India 1.911 1.287 1.883 1.661 1.089 0.863 3.632 5.868
14 Switzerland 1.590 1.485 1.568 0.862 1.737 1.478 1.151 0.405
15 Australia 1.488 1.205 1.468 1.537 1.168 1.035 1.045 1.063
16 Mexico 1.449 1.841 1.430 1.719 1.945 2.061 1.798 1.793
17 Spain 1.401 2.237 1.384 2.507 2.712 1.742 0.290 1.825
18 Brazil 1.396 1.069 1.378 1.563 0.896 1.887 1.561 2.627
19 Korea 1.346 2.512 1.329 1.706 2.307 2.413 5.506 1.652
20 Venezuela 1.222 0.427 1.208 0.266 0.294 0.658 0.624 0.256
21 Sweden 1.101 1.172 1.089 0.831 1.369 0.949 0.585 0.454
22 Argentina 0.973 0.368 0.964 0.382 0.350 0.939 0.617 0.856
23 Indonesia 0.956 0.737 0.947 0.636 0.696 0.996 0.872 1.602
24 Austria 0.861 1.129 0.854 0.701 1.412 0.731 0.214 0.466
25 South Africa 0.859 0.459 0.852 0.513 0.481 0.515 0.440 0.947
26 Nigeria 0.806 0.359 0.800 0.176 0.254 0.423 0.657 0.287
27 Norway 0.768 0.860 0.764 0.635 0.864 1.115 1.188 0.328
28 Denmark 0.755 1.040 0.751 0.590 1.016 1.341 0.983 0.318
29 Iran 0.688 0.435 0.685 0.385 0.362 0.267 1.061 0.908
30 Malaysia 0.683 1.374 0.680 0.290 1.120 1.207 1.983 0.474
31 Kuwait 0.635 0.355 0.633 0.154 0.253 0.357 0.235 0.077
32 Ukraine 0.631 0.301 0.629 0.162 0.293 0.351 0.371 0.545
33 Poland 0.629 0.779 0.627 0.634 0.801 0.951 1.064 0.826
34 Finland 0.581 0.529 0.580 0.451 0.649 0.636 0.282 0.275
35 Algeria 0.577 0.340 0.576 0.210 0.216 0.474 1.322 0.392
36 Turkey 0.548 0.751 0.547 0.742 0.734 1.573 1.114 0.927
37 Iraq 0.546 0.278 0.546 0.059 0.166 0.634 0.321 0.059
38 Libya 0.517 0.243 0.517 0.073 0.140 0.385 0.868 0.111
39 Thailand 0.497 0.909 0.498 0.395 0.913 1.096 1.294 0.903
40 Hungary 0.477 0.489 0.479 0.244 0.547 0.458 0.462 0.283
41 Pakistan 0.475 0.196 0.477 0.258 0.193 0.315 0.281 0.653
42 Romania 0.474 0.248 0.475 0.190 0.249 0.264 0.480 0.311
43 Egypt 0.434 0.253 0.436 0.214 0.237 0.387 0.495 0.505
44 Israel 0.427 0.544 0.429 0.302 0.516 0.596 0.735 0.263
45 New Zealand 0.411 0.239 0.414 0.234 0.263 0.238 0.204 0.170
46 Philippines 0.404 0.473 0.407 0.218 0.471 0.707 0.405 0.682
47 Portugal 0.399 0.481 0.402 0.424 0.577 0.421 0.143 0.349
48 Singapore 0.396 1.929 0.399 0.260 1.284 1.974 3.073 0.203
49 Chile 0.394 0.326 0.397 0.233 0.307 0.383 0.431 0.316
50 Ireland 0.385 1.660 0.389 0.444 1.599 2.967 0.061 0.277
1) Actual quota shares are post-Singapore increase; calculated quota shares are based on the current five-formula approach; voting 
shares assume that every member is eligible to vote; GDP is converted at market exchange rates and averages data from 2003-05; 
openness takes in current payments and receipts and averages data from 2001-05; variability includes fluctuations in exports and net 
capital flows over the period 1993 to 2005; reserves refer to a 12- month average for 2005; PPP is the country’s GDP share converted 
at PPP as an average for the period 2003-2005. For further explanations see main text.63
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GDP Openness Variablity Reserves PPP
51 Greece 0.378 0.485 0.382 0.632 0.508 0.884 0.026 0.415
52 Czech Republic 0.377 0.585 0.380 0.266 0.615 0.577 0.769 0.311
53 Colombia 0.356 0.219 0.360 0.246 0.204 0.272 0.373 0.561
54 Bulgaria 0.294 0.125 0.299 0.058 0.123 0.169 0.220 0.117
55 Peru 0.293 0.149 0.299 0.172 0.130 0.262 0.358 0.275
56 United Arab Emirates 0.281 0.508 0.287 0.264 0.436 0.415 0.566 0.213
57 Morocco 0.270 0.165 0.276 0.120 0.168 0.123 0.425 0.230
58 Bangladesh 0.245 0.099 0.251 0.144 0.109 0.049 0.077 0.500
59 Congo, Kinshasa 0.245 0.023 0.251 0.016 0.022 0.030 0.004 0.075
60 Zambia 0.225 0.027 0.231 0.014 0.022 0.072 0.013 0.018
61 Serbia 0.215 0.085 0.222 0.055 0.071 0.135 0.125 0.073
62 Sri Lanka 0.190 0.070 0.197 0.051 0.078 0.064 0.061 0.141
63 Belarus 0.178 0.116 0.185 0.058 0.119 0.126 0.029 0.120
64 Ghana 0.170 0.042 0.177 0.022 0.042 0.065 0.040 0.090
65 Kazakhstan 0.168 0.189 0.176 0.105 0.171 0.228 0.204 0.200
66 Croatia 0.168 0.149 0.176 0.085 0.157 0.179 0.231 0.091
67 Slovakia 0.164 0.247 0.172 0.100 0.243 0.174 0.420 0.143
68 Zimbabwe 0.162 0.023 0.170 0.015 0.021 0.021 0.001 0.056
69 Trinidad and Tobago 0.154 0.064 0.162 0.030 0.055 0.065 0.103 0.030
70 Vietnam 0.151 0.235 0.159 0.112 0.254 0.118 0.222 0.405
71 Côte d’Ivoire 0.149 0.060 0.158 0.038 0.061 0.048 0.039 0.047
72 Sudan 0.145 0.046 0.153 0.055 0.044 0.047 0.045 0.136
73 Uruguay 0.141 0.048 0.149 0.034 0.039 0.161 0.067 0.055
74 Ecuador 0.139 0.083 0.147 0.075 0.091 0.343 0.037 0.095
75 Syrian Arab Republic 0.135 0.114 0.143 0.254 0.081 0.109 0.003 0.120
76 Tunisia 0.132 0.106 0.140 0.067 0.120 0.095 0.108 0.138
77 Angola 0.132 0.156 0.140 0.052 0.111 0.280 0.055 0.066
78 Luxembourg 0.128 1.369 0.137 0.081 0.801 1.994 0.008 0.053
79 Uzbekistan 0.127 0.043 0.135 0.025 0.038 0.080 0.077 0.083
80 Jamaica 0.126 0.048 0.134 0.023 0.053 0.073 0.057 0.020
81 Kenya 0.125 0.037 0.133 0.041 0.039 0.064 0.043 0.080
82 Qatar 0.121 0.136 0.130 0.080 0.125 0.191 0.114 0.041
83 Myanmar 0.119 0.031 0.128 0.026 0.030 0.050 0.020 0.155
84 Yemen 0.112 0.110 0.121 0.032 0.054 0.284 0.151 0.033
85 Slovenia 0.107 0.148 0.116 0.078 0.159 0.088 0.219 0.073
86 Dominican Republic 0.101 0.090 0.110 0.062 0.108 0.092 0.039 0.109
87 Brunei Darussalam 0.099 0.050 0.108 0.014 0.039 0.077 0.013 0.016
88 Guatemala 0.097 0.066 0.106 0.069 0.069 0.071 0.097 0.096
89 Panama 0.095 0.048 0.104 0.035 0.050 0.109 0.028 0.039
90 Lebanon 0.093 0.182 0.103 0.052 0.147 0.269 0.304 0.041
91 Tanzania 0.091 0.034 0.101 0.028 0.031 0.016 0.056 0.044
92 Oman 0.089 0.145 0.099 0.063 0.118 0.154 0.110 0.068
93 Cameroon 0.085 0.032 0.095 0.038 0.033 0.107 0.022 0.072
94 Uganda 0.083 0.025 0.092 0.018 0.020 0.037 0.035 0.071
95 Bolivia 0.079 0.023 0.088 0.022 0.025 0.034 0.028 0.043
96 El Salvador 0.079 0.060 0.088 0.039 0.064 0.064 0.045 0.053
97 Jordan 0.078 0.080 0.088 0.028 0.079 0.081 0.145 0.046
98 Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.078 0.064 0.087 0.021 0.052 0.086 0.063 0.039
99 Costa Rica 0.075 0.078 0.085 0.046 0.082 0.092 0.059 0.075
100 Afghanistan 0.074 0.041 0.084 0.015 0.025 0.064 0.046 0.050
101 Senegal 0.074 0.024 0.084 0.019 0.023 0.029 0.035 0.034
102 Azerbaijan 0.074 0.050 0.084 0.023 0.045 0.047 0.028 0.058
103 Gabon 0.071 0.041 0.081 0.018 0.030 0.062 0.014 0.016
104 Georgia 0.069 0.019 0.079 0.013 0.018 0.028 0.012 0.025
105 Lithuania 0.066 0.101 0.076 0.055 0.101 0.101 0.095 0.079
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106 Cyprus 0.064 0.063 0.074 0.037 0.070 0.084 0.102 0.029
107 Namibia 0.063 0.023 0.073 0.013 0.022 0.022 0.009 0.025
108 Bahrain 0.062 0.142 0.072 0.028 0.101 0.236 0.048 0.026
109 Ethiopia 0.061 0.024 0.071 0.022 0.026 0.047 0.036 0.096
110 Papua New Guinea 0.060 0.028 0.070 0.010 0.024 0.038 0.017 0.024
111 Bahamas 0.060 0.026 0.070 0.014 0.027 0.023 0.019 0.011
112 Nicaragua 0.060 0.020 0.070 0.011 0.023 0.030 0.017 0.035
113 Honduras 0.060 0.038 0.070 0.019 0.039 0.035 0.057 0.036
114 Liberia 0.059 0.005 0.069 0.001 0.004 0.024 0.001 0.001
115 Latvia 0.058 0.058 0.068 0.033 0.063 0.046 0.057 0.047
116 Moldova 0.057 0.018 0.067 0.006 0.017 0.022 0.014 0.014
117 Madagascar 0.056 0.016 0.066 0.012 0.016 0.024 0.013 0.027
118 Iceland 0.054 0.039 0.064 0.033 0.045 0.043 0.026 0.017
119 Mozambique 0.052 0.025 0.062 0.014 0.023 0.023 0.028 0.043
120 Guinea 0.049 0.009 0.059 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.003 0.032
121 Sierra Leone 0.048 0.004 0.058 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.008
122 Malta 0.047 0.053 0.057 0.013 0.046 0.047 0.067 0.013
123 Mauritius 0.047 0.030 0.057 0.015 0.031 0.029 0.039 0.027
124 Paraguay 0.046 0.037 0.056 0.018 0.030 0.065 0.033 0.047
125 Mali 0.043 0.014 0.053 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.023 0.024
126 Suriname 0.042 0.010 0.053 0.003 0.008 0.018 0.003 0.005
127 Armenia 0.042 0.013 0.053 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.023
128 Guyana 0.042 0.010 0.052 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006
129 Kyrgyz Republic 0.041 0.010 0.051 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.014 0.018
130 Cambodia 0.040 0.031 0.051 0.013 0.032 0.021 0.026 0.056
131 Tajikistan 0.040 0.011 0.050 0.005 0.012 0.014 0.005 0.014
132 Congo, Brazzaville  0.039 0.032 0.049 0.011 0.027 0.045 0.009 0.007
133 Haiti 0.038 0.012 0.048 0.009 0.013 0.025 0.003 0.026
134 Somalia 0.038 0.002 0.048 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
135 Rwanda 0.037 0.006 0.047 0.004 0.005 0.017 0.009 0.020
136 Burundi 0.035 0.003 0.046 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.009
137 Turkmenistan 0.035 0.046 0.045 0.035 0.035 0.076 0.122 0.063
138 Togo 0.034 0.008 0.044 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.007 0.016
139 Nepal 0.033 0.020 0.043 0.018 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.066
140 Fiji 0.032 0.011 0.043 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.009
141 Malawi 0.032 0.006 0.042 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.013
142 Macedonia, FYR 0.032 0.027 0.042 0.013 0.025 0.037 0.026 0.026
143 Barbados 0.031 0.014 0.042 0.007 0.015 0.020 0.015 0.008
144 Niger 0.030 0.007 0.041 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.018
145 Estonia 0.030 0.072 0.041 0.029 0.076 0.051 0.047 0.036
146 Mauritania 0.030 0.007 0.040 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.012
147 Botswana 0.029 0.051 0.040 0.020 0.040 0.065 0.162 0.030
148 Benin 0.028 0.009 0.039 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.018 0.015
149 Burkina Faso 0.028 0.010 0.038 0.012 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.028
150 Chad 0.026 0.024 0.036 0.010 0.018 0.076 0.006 0.021
151 Central African Republic 0.026 0.003 0.036 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.008
152 Laos 0.024 0.007 0.035 0.006 0.007 0.013 0.006 0.020
153 Mongolia 0.023 0.010 0.034 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.009
154 Swaziland 0.023 0.020 0.034 0.006 0.019 0.027 0.008 0.010
155 Albania 0.022 0.027 0.033 0.017 0.024 0.025 0.036 0.028
156 Lesotho 0.016 0.011 0.027 0.003 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.009
157 Equatorial Guinea 0.015 0.041 0.026 0.011 0.037 0.060 0.040 0.030
158 Gambia 0.014 0.002 0.025 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005
159 Montenegro 0.013 0.009 0.024 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.005 0.005
160 Belize 0.009 0.006 0.020 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.00465
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Basic data (cont’d)









GDP Openness Variablity Reserves PPP
161 San Marino 0.008 0.020 0.019 0.003 0.016 0.017 0.010 0.003
162 Vanuatu 0.008 0.003 0.019 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.001
163 Djibouti 0.007 0.003 0.018 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.003
164 Eritrea 0.007 0.008 0.018 0.002 0.006 0.019 0.001 0.007
165 St. Lucia 0.007 0.004 0.018 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002
166 Guinea-Bissau 0.007 0.004 0.018 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.002 0.002
167 Antigua and Barbuda 0.006 0.006 0.017 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002
168 Grenada 0.005 0.003 0.017 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001
169 Samoa 0.005 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002
170 Solomon Islands 0.005 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
171 Cape Verde 0.004 0.004 0.016 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005
172 Comoros 0.004 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
173 St. Kitts and Nevis 0.004 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
174 Seychelles 0.004 0.005 0.015 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.002
175 St. Vincent/Grenadines 0.004 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
176 Dominica 0.004 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
177 Maldives 0.004 0.005 0.015 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004
178 Timor-Leste 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.014 0.001
179 São Tomé and Principe 0.003 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
180 Tonga 0.003 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
181 Bhutan 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.005
182 Kiribati 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.000
183 Micronesia 0.002 0.002 0.014 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
184 Marshall Islands 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
185 Palau 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000
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